provided that the accusation has been made in meetings or public places or in private attendance of sixteen or more individuals, they will be forced to give the slanderer right of public response, punished in the following way: - If the fact that is charged was of those with a criminal sentence indicated, they will be sentenced to prison for six to ten years, and if the act merits any other penalty, they will be sent to prison for two to six years. 27 99. Slander was mixed with insult in García Moreno's code, although the first variant continued to be the false accusation of a crime, but stated in a different way: Slander is the accusation made against a person of a specific fact of such a nature that it exposes them to prosecution for a crime or misdemeanor, or that it causes any dishonor, hatred or disregard in public opinion or any other damage. 28 The confusion with libel in this text comes from the source of its inspiration, article 443 of the Belgian criminal code. 29 This confusion was maintained verbatim in article 420 of the Eloy Alfaro code of 1906. 30 100. It can be said that, from the code of García Moreno, passing through that of Eloy Alfaro and up to 1938, the confusion of slander with insult and the questionable precision of the definition of the latter, did not respect the principle of strict criminal legality. 101. The 1938 code did not develop too much on the previous text by Eloy Alfaro, since it did not alter its structure, limiting itself to introducing some provisions inspired by Rocco's Italian code, but in this matter the codifiers seem to have realized the failure of previous texts and, despite using the term insult generically, clearly distinguished between slanderous and non-slanderous, defining the former precisely as the false accusation of a crime, a formula that leaves no room for doubt and, in article 469 (which with the number 493 is the one that was applied to the journalist and the editors) clearly refers to the slanderous insult that, beyond the nomen juris, is what in all comparative legislation is classified as slander. 102. Therefore, in the applied law it was perfectly delineated that slander against authority was prosecuted and that slander was understood as the false accusation of a crime. Beyond the sympathy or antipathy that this categorization may cause, it cannot be blamed for a lack of precision in the description of the behavior it wants to penalize: punishing the false accusation of a crime against the authorities. More precision could not be demanded from any legislator. 103. This case is completely different from the one resolved by this Court in the Case of Usón Ramírez vs. Venezuela 31, in which it was correctly considered that the State was internationally responsible for the conviction against Francisco Usón Ramírez for, among other things, the violation of the principle of legality due to the vague definition of the conduct characteristic of insults. In our case it is slander and the definition could not be more precise: false accusation of a crime. 27 Criminal Code of the Republic of Ecuador. Approved by the legislature in 1837, Reprinted by order of the Government, correct and reviewed by the Senate Permanent commission, Quito, March 16, 1845, Government Press, p. 95. 28 Article 478, on page 104 of the Código Penal y Código de Enjuiciamientos en materia criminal de la República del Ecuador, (Criminal Code and Criminal Prosecution Code of the Republic of Ecuador) New York, Printed by Halley and Breen, Fulton St, Nos. 58 - 60, 1872. F. S. G Nyppels, Législation Criminelle de la Belgique ou Commentaire et Complément du Code Pénal Belge,(Criminal Legislation of Belgium or Commentary and Supplement to the Belgian Penal Code) Brussels, 1872, Vol. III, page XLI. 29 30 Official Edition, page 94. I/A Court HR. Case of Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela. Preliminary Exceptions, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 20, 2009. Series C No. 207, par. 56 and 57. 31 16