therapeutic purposes, that of theft because unless starving or in a state of need is not added, or that of seizure for not making explicit unless it is in exercise of the right of retention. 110. In any case, this Court has made it clear, especially from the case of Kimel v. Argentina 32, that weighing up circumstances and values always prevails, without automatic resolution with the aforementioned legal formulas, since, for example, it cannot be considered that the justification for the injury to an official's honor takes place in the face of an extremely insignificant or trivial public interest, as is also the case when weighing the limit of any other cause of justification (such as an absolutely disproportionate defense, that of the electrification of a fence so that the child does not steal a flower). IV.2. Public Interest: the weighting of values IV.2.a. The weighting of values in general 111. In normal situations, it is necessary to protect journalism against punitive power when it comes to accusations directed at the authorities, for the sake of the right to criticize and publicly denounce, because this results in the proper functioning of the administration and institutions in general. 112. This protection is particularly essential when it comes to the possible commission of crimes of bribery, use of information, favor, illicit enrichment and other analogous crimes that are usually included in the vague characterization of corruption. 113. Here, two legal values are in opposition: the right to freedom of expression and criticism, and the official’s right to the honor. As in any situation in which two positive legal values converge, it is necessary to weigh them in each case, as this Court has done in its case law. In short, what this weighting should establish in each case, is the limit to the legitimate exercise of the right of denunciation and journalistic criticism enshrined in the constitutions and international law. 114. This, as was pointed out, is what occurs in normal situations, but the situation is not normal in a large part of our region, where there is no plurality of media, but instead, due to the media market deregulation, there are cases of oligopoly or monopoly which would not be, and are not, admissible in any country in the northern hemisphere. 115. In these abnormal situations, the monopolistic or oligopolistic concentration of print, radio, television and virtual media often allows communication to be distorted and a company or business or economic group to set up a completely distorted created reality. 116. The highly respectable opinion of the majority of the Court itself points to this disadvantage, and it is appropriate to point out that in these extremes there is the paradox that invoking freedom of opinion is likely to harm freedom of opinion itself, since the media monopoly has in its hands the ability to organize silence regarding events of public interest and their protagonists. 117. But it is necessary to point out that, in the abnormal situation of media monopolies and oligopolies, the problem goes beyond respect for freedom of opinion 32 I/A Court HR., Case of Kimel v. Argentina, Judgment of May 2, 2008, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Series C No. 177. 18