21. Thirdly, as a logical consequence of the analysis of the violations in the specific case, and of the aforementioned considerations regarding the limits of the use of criminal and civil law for the determination of subsequent liabilities, the judgment established a measure of reparation that must be understood in three complementary dimensions. First, it ordered that the State authorities, and in particular the judges, carry out a control of conventionality in such a way as to avoid the initiation of criminal proceedings for slander against journalists who issue opinions on matters of public interest in which they question the action of the authorities in the exercise of their duties, and that the principle of proportionality be respected in the imposition of civil sanctions. This measure was issued in this way because the regulations applicable in the case of the victims in the case had already been modified and no manifest incompatibility between the new regulations and the Convention was observed. 23 22. Second, the State was ordered to adopt legislative measures that prevent public officials from going to court to file lawsuits for slander and insults with the aim of silencing their critics. This reparation measure is directly related to the prohibition of the use of criminal law to sanction critical speech against the authorities in the terms indicated in the judgment, but it is also a reparation measure that represents an opportunity for the State to adopt anti- SLAPP provisions. In this way, it opens the door for the creation of procedural mechanisms that prevent civil lawsuits from silencing or disproportionately affecting those who are sued by the authorities, especially journalists or the media. Behind this measure is, as the judgment points out, the objective of allowing the plurality and diversity of the media, and preventing the authorities from indirectly affecting the journalistic and communication activities they carry out. 24 23. Third, the Judgment ordered training courses for public officials regarding the standards of the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights in relation to freedom of expression, judicial guarantees, and judicial protection. This measure is the corollary of the two previous measures, since in order for judicial officials to carry out an adequate control of conventionality and apply the current regulations in criminal and civil matters related to damages to the honor of public officials, it is necessary that they have the theoretical and practical tools that allow them to respect and guarantee freedom of expression. 25 On this point it is important to highlight that the protection of freedom of expression requires that the judges and prosecutors themselves be in charge of preventing the administration of justice system from being used as a means to censor journalists critical of the government. 24. The Judgment presents a first approach to the conceptualization in the Court's case law regarding the obligation of the States to protect freedom of expression through antiSLAPP measures or laws. These measures are aimed at preventing the establishment of subsequent liabilities from allowing the existence of lawsuits or other judicial actions that have the practical effect of excluding journalists, or other people who speak in the public sphere. Article 13 of the Convention does not expressly provide for this obligation, but it is essential that the interpretations of the scope of the Convention are aimed at achieving the useful effect of its provisions. SLAPP suits constitute serious attacks on freedom of expression, therefore the interpretation of Article 13 of the Convention must be consistent Cf. Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 24, 2021, par. 177-182. 23 24 182. 25 183. Cf. Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 24, 2021, par. Cf. Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 24, 2021, par. 7