22 With respect to the defendants in the civilian jurisdiction, Vladimiro Montesinos Torres, Nicolás de Bari Hermosa Ríos, Roberto Huamán Ascurra and Jesús Zamudio Aliaga, persons other than those in the military operation involved in the investigation into possible summary executions of surrendered terrorists, would constitute a case of a human rights violation defined as a crime against humanity, similar to other cases that have been reopened in the civilian jurisdiction, and therefore a joinder of cases would be appropriate […] insofar as they all derive from the same 99 criminal intent. 99. On October 15, 2003, more than one year after the jurisdictional challenge was settled, the Court Martial [Sala de Guerra del Supremo Tribunal Militar ] dismissed the case involving the crimes of violating international law [jus gentium], abuse of authority and qualified homicide in favor of all of the military personnel who were on trial and had participated in the operation. 100 Its reasoning was as follows: […] the Armed Forces having assumed […] control over a State of Emergency, for which the events were a consequence of service or duty-related acts and any illegality that may have derived from that service constitutes a duty-related crime, as there is a cause and effect relationship between the duty and the illegal acts ascribed. Therefore, the military criminal jurisdiction is found to be apt under the provisions of […] the Political Constitution of Peru, insofar as it meets the following requirements: a) the accused are active duty military personnel, b) they acted in the discharge of their assigned duties in the military operation, c) the legally protected interests is discipline and the protection of the values that inform military life, and d) the acts described in the complaint are defined in articles ninety-four, one hundred seventy-nine and one hundred eighty of the Code of Military Justice; the acts occurred as a result of a battle between the commandos […] and the subversive group…organized and equipped as a military force…in a struggle with the characteristics of a military battle, in which there were dead and wounded on both sides. It is therefore necessary to evaluate the necessary conditions for legitimate defense and the circumstances surrounding the battle, the dangerousness of the subversive agents who were provisioned with war weapons and supplies […] and who at all times demonstrated the belligerence inherent to terrorist groups, and a situation in which the lives of the hostages were in grave danger …having died (one hostage, Carlos Giusti Acuña) and two of the commandos involved, with several hostages and commandos seriously wounded. This is indicative of the intensity of the battle […] and therefore in conducting an objective assessment it was necessary to evaluate the necessary conditions to preserve the physical integrity and lives of the hostages … […]the version of extrajudicial executions […] is based solely on the sworn testimony provided by …Hidetaka Ogura […] and these claims […] have not been confirmed or upheld by a court of jurisdiction … […] the commandos acted in the legitimate defense of human life and in strict compliance with their constitutionally-protected official duties […] Due to the inherent nature of the events, it is impossible to know with certainty which of all of the shots fired caused the death of each one of the MRTA members, much less who did it. That being the case, the commission of international law violations [jus gentium], abuse of authority and qualified homicide to the detriment of the aforementioned MRTA members cannot be proved inasmuch as the deaths of the rebels were the result of the battles, inasmuch as it has not been proved that the alleged executions actually occurred, given the lack of incontrovertible and indisputable evidence in the record that would indicate otherwise, particularly if the events took place in a situation involving crossfire. The most rigorous and complete expert examinations relating to the thanatological studies of the bodies […] took place more than four years after the events occurred, which means, for example 99 Appendix 22, Non-certified copy of the Ruling handed down by the Transitory Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice on August 16, 2002, Appendix 2 of the State’s communication of February 6, 2009, appendix to the State’s communication of December 1, 2003, communication of the petitioners of February 3, 2003. 100 Appendix 9 Ruling of the Review Chamber of the Supreme Council of Military Justice of April 5, 2004, Appendix 3 to the State’s communication of February 6, 2009.