80. Thus, I disagree with the decision reached in the Judgment considering that the Convention makes a clear distinction between political and civil rights and economic, social and cultural rights. The right to social security is not a “recognized” right in the Convention and therefore is not under the protection system envisaged therein, which applies only to the first category of rights mentioned. In order to judicialize economic, social and cultural rights before the Court, it would be necessary to sign an additional Protocol, something that has not occurred in relation to the right to social security. 81. My dissent is also based on the fact that the content of Article 26 of the Convention refers to the States’ obligations of conduct, not the recognition of human rights. Moreover, this provision refers to the OAS Charter which, in turn, stipulates “goals” or “objectives” or “principles and mechanisms” that the States undertake to achieve or to implement, as appropriate. 82. In addition, I do not share the view expressed in the decision, given that, by allowing the provisions of Article 26 to be prosecuted before the Court, this would not only render Articles 31, 76(1) and 77(1) of the Convention largely meaningless, but would also allow all the rights “derived” from the OAS Charter to be so. This possibility is clearly far removed from what was agreed and, if that path were to be followed, it would undoubtedly lead to unsuspected consequences, not entirely beneficial for the effective respect of human rights. 83. Accordingly, I reiterate once again that I do not deny the existence of the right to social security which, in any case, does not figure in those terms in the standards contained in the OAS Charter, from which it is derived, pursuant to Article 26 of the Convention. I merely argue that its possible violation cannot be submitted to the Court for examination and a ruling. 84. Furthermore, this opinion should not be taken to mean that I would not eventually favor the international adjudication of economic, social and cultural rights before the Court. On this point, I believe that if we proceed with this course of action, it must be done by those responsible for international regulatory functions, that is, by the States through treaties, international custom and general principles of law or by unilateral legal acts. It does not seem appropriate that the body responsible for the inter-American judicial function should assume the international regulatory function, especially when the States Parties to the Convention are democratic and governed by the Inter-American Democratic Charter that envisages the separation of powers and citizens’ participation in public affairs.142 It seems fitting that this should also be reflected in matters concerning the international regulatory function, particularly of those norms that concern citizens more directly. Adopted at the 28th Special Session of the OAS General Assembly, September 11, 2001, Lima, Peru. Article 3: “Essential elements of representative democracy include, inter alia, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, access to and the exercise of power in accordance with the rule of law, the holding of periodic, free, and fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage as an expression of the sovereignty of the people, the pluralistic system of political parties and organizations, and the separation of powers and independence of the branches of government..” Article 6: “It is the right and responsibility of all citizens to participate in decisions relating to their own development. This is also a necessary condition for the full and effective exercise of democracy. Promoting and fostering diverse forms of participation strengthens democracy.” 142 27