As the Court has established, if two different norms are both applicable to a situation, “the norm most favorable to the individual must prevail.”50 78. In this case, the National Council of the Judiciary ordered the dismissal of the alleged victim as a judge, pursuant to article 31 of the Organic Law on the Judiciary, which established that the sanction of dismissal was applicable for “commission of a serious infraction that, while not criminal, compromises the dignity of the office and diminishes it in the eyes of the public.” 79. The Commission notes first that the grounds established in the law and applied in Mr. Cajahuanca Vásquez’s case provide for broad discretion and do not specify the conduct that would give cause for disciplinary action. The Commission also notes that, contrary to the standards cited, the legal framework does not define the sanctions applicable to the level of severity of the grounds described such that the disciplinary authority would have the elements needed to ensure that the sanction imposed is proportional to the seriousness of a judge’s misconduct. The Commission concludes that simple reference to a “serious infraction” without any indication as to how to recognize one is extremely problematic in light of the principle of legality as it applies to disciplinary matters. 80. Second, the Commission notes that article 211 of the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch establishes that magistrates shall be dismissed who commit a serious infraction that, while not criminal, compromises the dignity of the office and diminishes it in the eyes of the public, “as long as they have been suspended previously.” Likewise, article 10 of the same law stipulates that suspension is to be applied following a serious infraction after a judge has been sanctioned three times with fines. The Commission notes that, according to the petitioner (and the State did not indicate otherwise), he had not been sanctioned with a fine or suspension prior to his dismissal, yet nevertheless, he was given the most severe form of punishment. 81. The Commission notes that the Organic Law of the National Council of the Judiciary, which was also in force at that time, did not establish in its article 31 that prior suspension was required before dismissal could be applied. However, the IACHR finds that the existence of two different laws stipulating the possibility of applying either the sanction of dismissal or the sanction of suspension for the “commission of a serious infraction” violated the principle of legality set forth in article 9 of the Convention, which requires legal provisions to be specific enough that both conduct meriting sanction and the consequences thereof could be foreseeable. In addition, pursuant to the above cited standards on favorability, the Commission highlights that with both legal provisions in effect, Article 9 of the Convention requires the disciplinary authority to apply the most favorable one, which, in this case, was the Organic Law of the Judicial Branch, that required prior suspension in order to impose the sanction of dismissal. Instead, the disciplinary body opted to apply the least favorable legal provision. 82. Third, the Commission notes that on August 3, 1995, the Judiciary Oversight Office of the Judicial Branch asked the Supreme Court of Justice to request the dismissal of the alleged victim, arguing that “his conduct bordered on malicious, and a disciplinary sanction must be applied that is proportional to the gravity of his actions.” The Commission finds that the legal structure at the time did not allow for clear identification of elements such as the malice or seriousness of the actions against the image of the Judicial Branch or the dignity of its members, an aspect that granted excessive discretion to the judge in the application of the most severe sanction, as was the case here. 83. Fourth, the Commission observes that the grounds applied in Mr. Cajahuanca Vásquez’s case involved a serious infraction that, “while not criminal, compromises the dignity of the office and diminishes it in the eyes of the public.” In this regard, the Commission observes that Mr. Cajahuanca Vásquez was subjected to a criminal process based on the same facts as the disciplinary proceeding, in which he was convicted and later acquitted. Although the subject of this petition is not the criminal process but rather the disciplinary one, the Commission Inter-American Court. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment dated August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111. Para. 181. Citing: Cfr. Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants. Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 of September 17, 2003. Series A No. 73, para. 21; and The compulsory licensing of journalists. (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985. Series A No. 5, para. 52. 50 15