process and could not contest the dismissal decisions, they could not request review of said irregularities. 26. With regard to the requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies, the petitioners point out that “many actions were initiated, and many motions were filed to safeguard the victims’ rights.” First, they state that the Consolidated Petroleum Workers Union of Peru in Talara filed an action for amparo against the collective dismissal before the Civil Judge of Talara. At the same time, the adoption of precautionary protection measures was requested. On March 18, 1996, the judge declared the petition without merit on the argument that the amparo was not the appropriate means for challenging an Executive Decree that is general in nature. They point out that faced with this situation; the petitioners challenged the decision before the Second Civil Division of the Supreme Court of Piura, which upheld the lower court’s decision. The petitioners point out that they could not appeal this decision to the Constitutional Court because it had been dismantled by Congress during the time that the events took place. 27. Second, the petitioners state that they exhausted a popular action in which they sought to have Executive Decree 72-95-PCM, which authorized the company to begin the restructuring process, made inapplicable. The petitioners point out that it had been declared inadmissible by the Third Civil Division of the Supreme Court, alleging that the norm under question was general in nature. Third, the petitioners allege that they filed for an administrative dispute proceeding requesting that the decisions of the Labor Conflict Prevention and Settlement Office and those of the Piura Regional Office be declared null. On February 26, 1996, the Second Division of the Piura Superior Court declared the motion inadmissible because their demand for relief was “juristically impossible.” 28. Last, the petitioners allege that they have filed 82 actions before the Talara Labor Court to nullify the dismissals. They state that on December 27, 1997, the lower Court declared the motions filed without merit under the argument that the dismissals followed the procedure set forth in Decree Law No. 26120. On May 7, 1997, the Sullana Decentralized Mixed Division upheld the joint decision, arguing that “reinstatement of employment has been reduced in the neoliberal and free market system to three specific cases: discrimination, unionism, and maternity […] and these reasons have been neither invoked nor proven by the author.” 29. In processing the matter with the IACHR, the petitioners have alleged that the State has recognized “in several ways and through different authorities” their responsibility for the events of this case. However, the petitioners argue that this recognition of responsibility has not translated into effective reparation of the rights violated. Thus, the petitioners indicate that in the Final Report of the Special Commission on Collective Dismissals, created under Law No. 27452, presided over by the Ministry of Labor on January 2, 2002, it was stated that: The procedure […] established in Article 47 of DL 26120, as well as all decree laws covering the same procedure have infringed on the right to due process by not allowing for the exercise of the rights of appeal and defense on the part of the workers. In addition, other constitutional rights have been infringed upon, such as the right to information, and to non-discrimination [….]7 7 Special Commission on Collective Dismissals, Final Report submitted to the Congress of the Republic on December 31, 2001, Chapter VI. Number 3. 7