40 III. The interpretation of the word “only” [Note: “exclusivamente” in Spanish] in Article 23(2) and the obligation to guarantee political rights. 151. The representatives argued that “by requiring necessarily that, in order for a person to be able to take part in an election, he must be postulated exclusively by a political party, the Mexican legal framework violated the second paragraph of Article 23 of the Convention,” which establishes that the law can regulate political rights only for the reasons set out therein. These restrictions are specific not illustrative, so that domestic law cannot include others that are not expressly established in the said provision, since this provision uses the word “only.” According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the term “only” must be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose. In this regard, the meaning of the word “only” equals “exclusively”; it is synonymous with “solely” and therefore excludes any possibility of adding to the established restrictions any that are not expressly included. Although it is not necessary to resort to the complementary means of interpretation established by the Vienna Convention, they indicated that the terms used in the four official languages of the American Convention (“only,” in the English version, “exclusivement,” in the French version, and “exclusivamente,” in [the Spanish and] the Portuguese version[s]) have exactly the same meaning and there is no difference in what they signify. The requirements enumerated in Article 23(2) of the American Convention mesh with the provisions of Articles 29 and 30 thereof, so that domestic law cannot enact a norm for reasons of general interest with a purpose that contradicts an express provision of this convention. The restrictions established in Article 23(2) of the Convention are lex specialis, applicable to human rights of a political nature, while Articles 29 and 30 thereof are norms applicable, in general, to all the provisions of the Convention. Lastly, they stated that TRIFE had already ruled on the compatibility with the American Convention and the Constitution of a legal provision establishing that the request for the registration of candidates can only be presented by the political parties, but it did so erroneously, failing to examine the word “only” in Article 23(2) of the Convention. 152. Among other arguments, the State indicated that “an electoral system that establishes the postulation of candidates by political parties does not per se violate the provision on political rights of the American Convention.” Political rights are not absolute, so that they can be subject to limitations, provided this regulation observes “the principles of lawfulness, necessity and proportionality in a democratic society.” Article 175 of the Electoral Code, which establishes that only political parties may postulate candidacies for elected office at the federal level, does not violate the passive right to vote established in Article 23 of the American Convention, because it is a means of exercising this political right that is consistent with the relevant international standards in terms of lawfulness, necessity and proportionality. The State affirmed that a distinction must be made between direct limitations or restrictions, such as the exclusion of a specific group of individuals from their passive right to vote based on gender or race, and the modalities that the legislator establishes for the exercise of political rights. In order to exercise these rights, the State may require that “a specific juridical mechanism or specific conditions and methods are used,” such as, for example, the impossibility of registering a candidate for several elected offices in the same electoral process, the impossibility of being a candidate for an elected federal office and, at the same time, being a candidate for another position in one of the states. This should not be understood as a limitation of the passive right to vote but as a mechanism for exercising it which, in addition to not being excessive, responds to a juridical, political and historic rationale. * * *