criminal law to generate an intimidating environment that inhibits speech and debate about episodes of public interest114. 91. The second hypothesis of the rule in question subjects the definition of unlawful conduct to the verification of subjective criteria such as the expression "proffered in discredit, dishonor, or disparagement". That is, it refers to elements that can only be defined by the judge ex post facto and is not capable of guiding the conduct of individuals, in the face of the serious consequence that imprisonment and the derogation of political rights mean. 92. In the present case, the State has not shown that the elements of the criminal offense under study have been specified in the judgment in this case, in such a way as to permit the broadest debate on matters of public interest and the exceptional use of criminal law to establish subsequent liabilities when faced with speeches specially protected by the right to freedom of expression as the jurisprudence of the InterAmerican System has repeatedly demanded. On the contrary, the court considered as a basis of criminal attribution subjective elements, such as that the article "No a las mentiras”, has had national and world-wide dissemination, which insults [President Correa] regarding the events of September 30, 2010 (...), because it undermines the trust that people have in him"115. 93. The Commission notes that in the specific case an aggravating circumstance was applied, increasing criminal liability: the fact that the slanderous insult was "directed to an authority" (Article 493). In this regard, the Inter-American Commission reaffirmed that desacato laws, which offer greater protection to public officials, are not compatible with the spirit of the Convention. "The implementation of desacato laws to protect the honor of public officials who act in an official capacity, unjustifiably gives them a right to protection that is not available to other members of society. Moreover, by protecting officials against defamatory expressions, desacato laws establish a structure that ultimately protects the government itself from criticism," the Commission said in its 1995 report116. 94. The Commission is aware that in 2014, the State of Ecuador modified the crime of slander, through Article 182 of the new Comprehensive Criminal Organic Code. Which was drafted as follows: "[t]he person who, by any means, makes a false accusation of one crime against another person, shall be punished with imprisonment from six months to two years." In its second paragraph, it adds: "it is not considered slander statements issued before authorities, judges, and courts, when the accusations have been made based on the defense of the case." And continues: "it shall not be responsible for slander the person who proves the veracity of the accusations. However, in no case will evidence be admitted about the imputation of an offense that has been the subject of a sentence ratifying the innocence of the accused or dismissing or archiving the case." 95. Despite the 2014 amendment and the repeal of the criminal offense of slanderous insult, the State did not unequivocally eliminate the possibility of criminalizing criticism directed at public authorities. This could open the way to criminal proceedings that have an inhibitory effect on speeches of public interest. Likewise, the judgment against Palacio and the executives of El Universo has not been reviewed or revoked by the State in light of the elements of the new criminal offense, thus the sanction remains firm to this day. 96. In view of the foregoing, the Commission concludes that the ambiguity and scope of Article 489 and following of the Criminal Code, applied in this case, imply a breach of the requirement of strict legality in the imposition of restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression of Emilio Palacios, Carlos Nicolás Pérez Lapentti, César Enrique Pérez Barriga, and Carlos Eduardo Pérez Barriga, resulting in a violation of Article 13.1 and 13.2 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1.1 thereof. In the same way, since this violation has occurred as a result of the application of a law that does not comply with the requirements of strict legality and, 114 IACHR, Report No. 88/10, Case 12.661, Merits, Néstor José and Luís Uzcátegui et al., Venezuela, July 14, 2010, para. 279. 115 Annex 13. First instance judgment. Annex No. 32 of the Initial Petition presented to the IACHR on October 24, 2011. 116 IACHR. Annual Report 1994. Chapter V: Report on the Compatibility of “Desacato” Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights. Title III. OEA/Ser. L/V/II.88. doc. 9 rev. February 17, 1995, pages 210 to 223. Annex D. 21