45 132. The American Convention establishes that the Court exercises full jurisdiction over matters relating to a case submitted to its consideration, even relating to the procedural requirements on which the possibility of it exercising its jurisdiction are based.27 133. Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention establishes that in order to determine the admissibility of a petition or communication lodged with the Inter-American Commission in accordance with los Articles 44 or 45 of the Convention, remedies under domestic law must have been pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law.28 134. This Court has indicated that when Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention states that domestic remedies must be filed and exhausted according to generally recognized principles of international law, this means that such remedies should not only exist formally, but should also be adequate and effective, as a result of the objections included in Article 46(2) of the Convention.29 135. The Court reiterates the criteria for filing the objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies that must be respected in this case. First, the defendant State can expressly or tacitly waive invoking the failure to exhaust domestic remedies.30 Second, in order to be opportune, the objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies must be filed at the admissibility stage of the proceeding before the Commission; that is, before any consideration of merits; if this has not been done, it is presumed that the State tacitly waived the possibility of filing this objection.31 Third, the Court has indicated that the failure to exhaust domestic resources is merely a matter of admissibility and that the State alleging it must indicate the domestic remedies that should be exhausted, and also prove that such remedies are effective.32 136. The Court observes that María Victoria Cruz Franco, mother of Ernestina and Erlinda Serrano Cruz, filed a petition for habeas corpus on November 13, 1995, before the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of El Salvador; it was resolved by a decision of March 14, 1996, which decided “[t]o dismiss [the petition] because it had not included the procedural grounds for establishing a violation of the Constitution[, …] and to remit [the decision] to the Chalatenango Judge of First Instance, together with case file 112/93, so that the investigation into the reported facts may continue.” Consequently, the Chalatenango Court of First 27 Cf. Case of Tibi, supra note 26, para. 47; Case of Herrera Ulloa. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107, para. 79; and Case of Juan Humberto Sánchez. Judgment of June 7, 2003. Series C No. 99, para. 65. 28 Cf. Case of Tibi, supra note 26, para. 48; and Case of Herrera Ulloa, supra note 27, para. 80. 29 Cf. Case of Tibi, supra note 26, para. 50; Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community. Preliminary objections. Judgment of February 1, 2000. Series C No. 66, para. 53; and Case of Loayza Tamayo. Preliminary objections. Judgment of January 31, 1996. Series C No. 25, para. 40. 30 Cf. Case of Tibi, supra note 26, para. 49; Case of Herrera Ulloa, supra note 27, para. 81; and Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community. Preliminary objections, supra note 29, para. 53. 31 Cf. Case of Tibi, supra note 26, para. 49; Case of Herrera Ulloa, supra note 27, para. 81; and Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community. Preliminary objections, supra note 29, para. 53. 32 Cf. Case of Tibi, supra note 26, para. 49; Case of Herrera Ulloa, supra note 27, para. 81; and Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community. Preliminary objections, supra note 29, para. 53.