31 State still has a duty to recognize the right to property of members of the Saramaka people, within the framework of a communal property system, and establish the mechanisms necessary to give domestic legal effect to such right recognized in the Convention, as interpreted by this Tribunal in its jurisprudence (supra paras. 88-98). 103. Furthermore, the State’s argument that it would be discriminatory to pass legislation that recognizes communal forms of land ownership is also without merit. It is a wellestablished principle of international law that unequal treatment towards persons in unequal situations does not necessarily amount to impermissible discrimination.103 Legislation that recognizes said differences is therefore not necessarily discriminatory. In the context of members of indigenous and tribal peoples, this Court has already stated that special measures are necessary in order to ensure their survival in accordance with their traditions and customs (supra paras. 78-86, 91, and 96). Thus, the State’s arguments regarding its inability to create legislation in this area due to the alleged complexity of the issue or the possible discriminatory nature of such legislation are without merit. C.3) Judge-made law 104. Additionally, the State argued that judge-made law could recognize collective property rights, but that the members of the Saramaka people have refused to apply to domestic courts for said recognition. First and foremost, a distinction should be made between the State’s duty under Article 2 of the Convention to give domestic legal effect to the rights recognized therein, and the duty under Article 25 to provide adequate and effective recourses to remedy alleged violations of those rights. The Court will address infra (paras. 76-85), in its analysis of the alleged violation of Article 25 of the Convention, the effectiveness of the recourses mentioned by the State, including those available under article 1386 of Suriname’s Civil Code, to remedy alleged violations of the right to property of members of the Saramaka people in conformity with their system of communal property. 105. The Court observes that although so-called judge-made law may certainly be a means for the recognition of the rights of individuals, particularly under common-law legal systems, the availability of such a procedure does not, in and of itself, comply with the State’s obligation to give legal effect to the rights recognized in the American Convention. That is, the mere possibility of recognition of rights through a certain judicial process is no substitute for the actual recognition of such rights. The judicial process mentioned by the State is thus to be understood as a means by which said rights might be given domestic legal effect at some point in the future, but that has not yet effectively recognized the rights in question. In any case, the right of the members of the Saramaka people in particular, or members of indigenous and tribal communities in general, to collectively own their territory has not, as of yet, been recognized by any domestic court in Suriname. 103 Cf., for example, ECHR, Connors v. The United Kingdom, supra note 76, para. 84 (declaring that States have an obligation to take positive steps to provide for and protect the different lifestyles of minorities as a way to provide equality under the law). Cf. also Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, supra note 76, (stating that “within international law generally, and Inter-American law specifically, special protections for indigenous peoples may be required for them to exercise their rights fully and equally with the rest of the population. Additionally, special protections for indigenous peoples may be required to ensure their physical and cultural survival -- a right protected in a range of international instruments and conventions”). Cf. also U.N. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Art. 1.4 (stating that “[s]pecial measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination”), and UNCERD, General Recommendation No. 23, Rights of indigenous peoples, supra note 76, para. 4 (calling upon States to take certain measures in order to recognize and ensure the rights of indigenous peoples).