12 be circumscribed to the specific issue of the termination or the suspension of the application of a treaty (supra), and not extending itself likewise, e.g., to the forms of manifestation of the consent of the State (i.e., signature, approval, and ratification of a treaty, or accession to it, and acceptance of an optional clause of recognition of the jurisdiction of an international supervisory organ). In contracting conventional obligations of protection, it is not reasonable, on the part of the State, to assume a discretion so unduly broad and conditioning of the extent itself of such obligations, which would militate against the integrity of the treaty. 33. The principles and methods of interpretation of human rights treaties, developed in the case-law of conventional organs of protection, can much assist and foster this necessary evolution. Thus, in so far as human rights treaties are concerned, one is to bear always in mind the objective character of the obligations enshrined therein, the autonomous meaning (in relation to the domestic law of the States) of the terms of such treaties, the collective guarantee underlying them, the wide scope of the obligations of protection and the restrictive interpretation of permissible restrictions. These elements converge in sustaining the integrity of human rights treaties, in seeking the fulfillment of their object and purpose, and, accordingly, in establishing limits to State voluntarism. From all this one can detect a new vision of the relations between public power and the human being, which is summed up, ultimately, in the recognition that the State exists for the human being, and not vice-versa. 34. The juridical concepts and categories, inasmuch as they enshrine values, are a product of their time, and, as such, are in constant evolution. The protection of the human being in any circumstances, against all the manifestations of arbitrary power, corresponds to the new ethos of our times, which is to be reflected in the postulates of Public International Law. There is - may I insist - no juridical imposibility to reconsider such postulates in the light of the needs of protection of the human being. Such needs ought to prevail over limitations ratione temporis, or of other kind, of the conventional organs of protection. Otherwise, we will always be revolving in vicious circles generated by the already mentioned tension between the postulates of the law of treaties, in the framework of Public International Law, and those of the International Law of Human Rights. 35. A pertinent illustration, in the contentious proceedings of the present Blake case, is found in the difficulties experienced both by the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights and by the representative of the relatives of the disappeared person (Ms. Joanne Hoeper), as well as by the respondent State, in presenting, in the public hearing before the Court of 10.06.1998, distinct arguments as to the claims for reparations and indemnities, and costs, in relation to the violations of Articles 5 and 8(1), in combination with Article 1(1), of the American Convention, established by the Court in the Judgment on the merits of 24.01.1998, in a form "separated" from the detention, disappearance and death of Mr. Nicholas Chapman Blake. 36. I do not see how to "separate" the intense suffering of the relatives of the disappeared person (Article 5), also victims in the present case (cf. infra), and the lack of the due process of law and of the investigation of the facts (Article 8(1)), in combination with the general duty to respect the protected rights and to secure their free and full exercise (Article 1(1)), from the context of the forced disappearance of Mr. Nicholas Chapman Blake. The debates of the public hearing before the Court of 10.06.1998, in which all those who intervened - the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the representative of the relatives of the victim, and the respondent