12 It should be added that, in this case, considering that “the Admissibility Report was issued on March 9, 2007,”41 the lapse between the latter and the date of the petition – “August 22, 2003”42 – was slightly more than three years and six months. B. The failure to exhaust domestic remedies in relation to the restriction of the right to leave the country Regarding the second justification for the preliminary objection filed by the State, the Judgment indicates, as grounds to reject it, that “regarding the failure to exhaust domestic remedies in relation to the January 2003 restriction of the right to leave the country, the Court observes that the alleged victim did not file any remedy before the domestic courts,” and that “[h]owever the State did not contest its admissibility at the first stages of the proceedings before the Commission and did not indicate which remedies the alleged victim should have exhausted; moreover, it did not do so before this Court either.”43 When indicating the above, the Judgment did not consider that, since the alleged victim had not filed any remedy before the domestic courts owing to the 2003 restriction of the right to leave the country, and had not argued that he did not have to do so, the State did not have the opportunity to file a specific preliminary objection in this regard during the admissibility proceedings before the Commission. Thus, attention should be drawn to the fact that the preliminary objection filed by the State in this regard does not refer to the petition lodged before the Commission, but to the admissibility decision that the Commission adopted on the petition. It is perhaps for this reason that it is asserted in the Judgment that “the alleged victim made no specific mention regarding the failure to exhaust domestic remedies in relation to the restriction of the right to leave the country.”44 Consequently, by rejecting this justification for the objection filed by the State, the Judgment appears merely to consider that it did not negate the admissibility of the petition. However, the Judgment fails to mention that the petitioner not only failed to exhaust any remedy in this regard, but, in addition, he failed to allege that it was impossible to do this. Thus, in fact, it could be deemed that, regarding the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Judgment considered that the only entity with an obligation is the State, which evidently is not in keeping with the provisions of the Convention. Moreover, if this view is accepted, it would reduce the meaning and scope of this rule to a minimum, affecting the essential procedural balance in the case in question. CONCLUSION In short, this dissenting opinion indicates a disagreement with what was decided in the Judgment, because, in the opinion of the undersigned, it is not in keeping with the provisions of Articles 46, 47 and 48 of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 61(2) of this instrument. In other words, by taking the position it did, the Judgment disregarded the principle of subsidiarity and complementarity that inspires the inter-American human rights system; the legal certainty and security with which the provisions of the Convention should be interpreted and applied, and the procedural balance and equality between the parties 41 Para. 17. 42 Idem. 43 Para. 20. 44 Para. 13.