24 hours without a trial. In no case shall the suspect be detained in solitary confinement for more than 24 hours.” The constitution adopted in 1998 established in Article 24(6) that: [n]o one shall be deprived of their liberty except by written order of a competent judge for the crimes, for the time periods, and under the terms prescribed by law, except in cases of crimes discovered while in progress, in which case the suspect still cannot be detained for more than 24 hours without a trial. An exception is made for disciplinary detentions established by law within public security forces. No one shall be held in solitary confinement. 38. Article 19(17)(j) of the constitution that was in effect in 1997, as well as Article 93 of the Constitution of 1998, established the “right” of habeas corpus, which could be exercised “directly or through a third party, without need for an order,” by “any person” who believes he or she “is being unlawfully deprived of liberty.” Both provisions stated that the petition for habeas corpus had to be presented before the mayor of the jurisdiction in which the detained person was located. According to both legal texts, “[t]he municipal authority” could order the release of the petitioner. The Constitution of 2008 (supra para. 36) required that the “action” for habeas corpus be processed by a judicial authority. 33 39. Regarding infra-constitutional law, the Military Criminal Procedure Code of 1961 is important, as its Article 25 indicated that “given the proven existence of a crime or a fact with the characteristics of an offense under investigation, if there is circumstantial evidence or there are presumptions pointing to someone as a perpetrator, accomplice, or accessory, that person shall be detained.” Article 29 of the same code established that: “[t]he detention shall always take place within the barracks or a military criminal facility where the preliminary proceedings are taking place. The suspect will be held in solitary confinement before making the initial formal statement.” 40. It is also important to mention the 1983 Code of Criminal Procedure, which functioned, according to the State, as “a supplement to adjective military criminal law.” Its Article 170 established that: “[i]n order to guarantee the procedural immediacy of the defendant in the trial, the payment of compensation for damages, and procedural expenses, the judge can order precautionary (preventive) measures of a personal or substantive nature.” Article 172 established: [f]or the purpose of investigating a crime before the criminal trial for it has begun, the competent judge can order the detention of an individual, whether on the basis of personal knowledge or verbal or written reports of agents of the National Police or Judicial Police or of any other person, that document the crime and the corresponding presumptions of culpability. 41. Article 177 of the same code established that: [t]he judge can issue an order for pretrial detention if he or she deems it necessary, as long as the following procedural information is present: (1) Circumstantial evidence indicating the existence of a crime meriting the deprivation of liberty; and (2) Circumstantial evidence indicating that the defendant is the perpetrator or accomplice of the crime at issue in the trial. The order shall specify the circumstantial evidence on which the detention is based. B. Facts preceding the first detention of Mr. Cortez 42. Gonzalo Orlando Cortez Espinoza was a member of the Armed Forces of Ecuador from August 25, 1978, to February 28, 1994, at which point he was discharged at his request. 34 In Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador. Monitoring Compliance with Judgment, supra, considering paragraph 30. 34 Cf. Ministry of National Defense. Personnel archive of the Armed Forces. Time-in-service settlement No. 000557 of March 3, 2005 (evidence file, annex 1 to the Merits Report, folio 6). 33 12