17. This Court considers it important for the Commission to ensure a reasonable timeframe in processing cases. 8 It has also expressed its concern, with regard to this case, about the duration of the proceedings before the Commission (supra para. 4), as a long delay of case proceedings in the inter-American system can harm victims’ rights by directly affecting access to justice. Nevertheless, a lengthy process is not in itself a reason for the Court to not hear a case, if concrete, significant harm to the State's right to defense is not shown. 18. Ecuador has not demonstrated that concrete harm. Its assertion regarding difficulties in securing evidentiary support is general; it does not specify which evidentiary elements it was prevented from gathering. With respect to the change in the “factual account” of the case, this Court has previously noted that even if the passage of time has required the State to modify its litigation strategy, that in itself does not prevent it from exercising its right to defense. 9 It is the same in this case. Moreover, during the admissibility stage, Ecuador had the opportunity to rectify the human rights violations alleged by the petitioner. 10 19. The Court has observed no concrete harm to the State’s right to defense during the proceedings of the case before the Commission. The Court therefore rejects the State's preliminary objection concerning an alleged violation of its right to defense. B. Preliminary objection regarding the failure to exhaust domestic remedies B.1 Arguments of the State and the Commission 20. The State first addressed the criminal trial. It argued that the alleged victim presented his initial petition before the Inter-American Commission while the criminal trial against him was in progress, and that the trial was in its initial stage at that point. 21. Second, it referred to remedies related to the deprivation of liberty. It noted that Mr. Cortez did not present the remedy of habeas corpus, which “could have ended the allegedly arbitrary or unlawful detention he experienced [in 1997].” 11 It mentioned also the “remedy of the liberty amparo.” It argued that this remedy allows, during the course of the criminal trial, for the judge above the one who had ordered the deprivation of liberty to decide on its lawfulness and, if appropriate, release the detained individual. Ecuador stated that “Mr. Cortez Espinoza had the opportunity to propose [this] remedy [...] in 1997 during the course of the military criminal trial against him, as the law established neither a time limit for using this remedy nor formal requirements for filing it.” Notably, it stated that this remedy would have been appropriate for the deprivation of liberty Mr. Cortez experienced in July of 1997. 12 It 8 Cf. Case of Mémoli v. Argentina. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of August 22, 2013. Series C No. 265, para. 41. 9 Cf. Case of Montesinos Mejía v. Ecuador. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of January 27, 2020. Series C No. 398, para. 39. 10 Cf. Case of Wong Ho Wing v. Peru. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of June 30, 2015. Series C No. 297, para. 28, and Case of Barbosa de Souza et al. v. Brazil. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations, and costs. Judgment of September 7, 2021. Series C No. 435, para. 33. The State also argued that there was a change in the factual circumstances of the case after the decision on admissibility. The Merits Report, however, did not analyze facts after November 1, 2011, when the Admissibility Report was issued. It is true that the Merits Report mentions, in its “determinations of fact,” documents issued in 2010 and 2017 concerning Mr. Cortez Espinoza’s criminal background, but those are factual elements that did not influence the Commission’s legal analysis. 11 The State noted that the Inter-American Court has “already taken note of the effectiveness of the remedy as it was previously conceived, as it would be resolved by an administrative authority.” It stated, however, that “unfavorable decisions by the [m]ayor could be appealed before the Constitutional Court, an authority that did exercise judicial review,” and that “[i]n the case of Mr. Cortez Espinoza, this is in effect what happened, as it was the Constitutional Court that accepted the remedy of habeas corpus and ordered that the alleged victim be released due to the February 2000 detention.” 12 The State indicated that “the alleged victim could have taken this action at any point during his 1997 detention.” Though the Commission and the representatives argued that Mr. Cortez was deprived of liberty not just 7