systems or with the substantive and procedural disciplinary regime applicable to justices of the Supreme Court.” It added that “in addition fueling doubts about the independence of the Judiciary, the absence of clear rules on the grounds and procedures for removing judges from office c[ould] lead to arbitrary abuses of power, with direct repercussions for the rights to due process and freedom from ex post facto laws.” According to the Commission, “there was no legal or constitutional basis which granted Congress jurisdiction to dismiss or impeach the judges,” but it did not comment on the violation of Article 23 of the Convention, given that it was not included in the admissibility report issued in this case. 106. Regarding the independence of the National Congress in resolving to dismiss the justices of the Supreme Court, the Commission argued that the applicable procedures must be clearly established by law, something that did not occur in this case, and therefore it may be “inferred that the National Congress did not act with the necessary guarantees of independence in terminating the [alleged] victims”. 107. The representatives argued that “[t]he National Congress interfer[ed], without constitutional jurisdiction, in the operation of the judiciary and of the Supreme Court.” They noted that “the dismissal of the judges before completion of their constitutional term, and by decision of an incompetent body, constituted [a] violation of judicial independence.” As to the possible violation of Article 23(1) (c) of the Convention, the representatives added that the “Constitution in force at the time of the facts, recognize [d] that every citizen in Ecuador ha[d] the right to hold public positions and public office”, that such a role should be understood as “tenure in public office” and that persons should not be “arbitrarily dismissed from their positions.” They concluded that a judge’s exercise of public office was “a right of judges, but at the same time a guarantee that they [could] discharge their duties with independence, which guarantees the right to judicial independence”. 108. The representatives also held that “the National Congress did not have jurisdiction to examine [a] matter related to the judiciary,” given that the “[c]ompetent tribunal, according to the provisions established in the Ecuadorian legal system, was the Supreme Court of Justice itself.” They added that in this case, the “National Congress, by ruling on the rights of judges without constitutional jurisdiction, became an ad hoc tribunal”, thereby violating their right to be brought before a competent tribunal. 109. The representatives further argued that “after Congress had assum[ed] the role of an ad hoc judge, it had an obligation to guarantee a person’s right to be [judged by] an independent court.” Therefore, they argued, the “National Congress c[ould] hardly guarantee independence, being a political body by nature [and] even less so in this case, when it responds to the interests of the government and of parliamentary majorities.” 110. The State argued that there was no violation of Article 23 of the Convention because two of the former judges who were removed “held high positions after their dismissal [,] in the first case, as President of the National Court of Justice (former Supreme Court of Justice), and in the second as a judge of the Electoral Contentious Court.” It argued that “none of the six judges of the Court of 97 ha[d] been denied opportunities for participation and, as convincing evidence [,] many of the former judges of the Court of 1997 participated in the current process to appoint the National Court. Moreover, in its final arguments, the State pointed out that according to Transitory Provision 25, the former judges “should have ceased their functions in 2003” and that “[t]he National Congress [had] complied with this mandatory constitutional provision on December 8, 2004”. 111. In relation to the National Congress’s guarantee of independence, the State argued that the judges’ dismissal “wa[s] a situation, a legal reality confirmed by the expiry of the judges’ term of office”, that “the determining fact [in their dismissal] was the passage of 36