justices over the space of two years, and the activation of that supposed competence in a political context marked by pronounced tension with the judiciary”. 122. The representatives argued that “[s]ince the motivation was political and not legal, given that the lawmakers who constituted the ad hoc tribunal had preconceived opinions, which responded to the interests of the President and of several political parties at the time” there was a violation of the principle of impartiality to which the alleged victims were entitled. Furthermore, the representatives argued that the National Congress was not impartial “because it knew the outcome even before the start of the special session of Congress.” 123. For its part, the State argued that from the facts “there is no indication that members of Congress ha[d] a direct interest in the resolution[,] since the dismissal was prompted by a legal fact verifiable in the expiry of the judges’ term for exercising their duties” and that “it was prompted by an objective criterion which was not only contemplated in the Constitution, in Transitory Provision 25, but was confirmed on December 8, 2004, at the special session of Congress when it examine the legality of the judicial officials’ positions.” 6. 124. Arguments regarding the right to appeal the decision The Commission did not refer to this point. 125. The representatives argued that “the Constitution in force at the time did not contemplate any remedies to challenge actions by the National Congress.” They added that “[t]he violation of the right to appeal occur [red] ‘de iure and de facto”, because: i) “the Constitution did not provide for a mechanism to ensure that the resolution, in its procedure and substance, did not entail a violation of rights”, and ii) “the resolution could not effectively be appealed before another body.” Therefore, they considered that by “not having remedies available” it “violated the right to appeal decisions that violate human rights.” 126. laws) The State did not offer arguments on this point. 7. Arguments regarding the principle of legality (freedom from ex post facto 127. The Commission argued that i) “at the time when the Supreme Court justices were appointed […] and dismissed […], no regulations governing the constitutionally established systems for terminations and vacancies were in place”; ii) “neither were there any regulations in place for the disciplinary system applicable to members of the Court” and iii) the alleged victims “were denied prior knowledge of the grounds for which they could be removed from office, the competent authority for doing so, and the applicable procedure.” It argued that “[at] the time the functions of the alleged victims were terminated, other than the constitutional duty requiring Congress to establish a legal framework, according to the information available, those provisions had not yet passed into law. Nor were there any regulations covering the Supreme Court’s disciplinary system, the grounds for the removal of judges, the procedure to be followed, or the competent authority for doing so.” In this regard, it argued that “an ad hoc mechanism - provided for neither in the Constitution nor in law – was created to terminate the functions of all the Supreme Court justices on the grounds that their mandates had expired. That was in spite of the fact that […] their appointment was for an indefinite period, subject to grounds for removal to be determined by law.” Finally, the Commission argued that “[i]n the absence of a comprehensive punitive system, […] any proceeding followed in those circumstances [would] per se have violated Article 9 of the 39