132. The State argued that “the Ecuadorian State has a regulatory system with a legal framework for the administration of justice, the appointment and removal of judges and the disciplinary system of the judiciary.” It added that “[i]n relation to the possibility of removing judges of the Supreme Court of Justice, it clearly establishes the body responsible for conducting this process, having regard to the criteria of hierarchy and responsibility.” The State added that currently “there is a public policy for the protection of human rights and the re-engineering of the administration of justice, which is first glimpsed in the 1998 Constitution, [the] Organic Law of the Council [of the] Judiciary, [the] Law of Constitutional Control and which is consolidated, reaffirmed and developed in the Montecristi Constitution of 2008, in the Organic Code of the Judiciary and in the Organic Law of Jurisdictional Guarantees and Constitutional Control.” As to the representatives’ allegations that problems existed in the current legislation, the State said it “formally reject[ed] such assertions, since they [we]re based on legal speculations and not on specific, provable and measurable facts, given that the comprehensive process of judicial reform undertaken by the National Council of the Judiciary of Transition ha[d] not concluded and therefore potential situations [could] be judged a priori.” 9. Arguments on judicial protection 133. As to the alleged violation of Article 25 of the American Convention, the Commission reiterated that “as held by the Court’s constant jurisprudence, a remedy which proves illusory because of the general conditions prevailing in the country, or even in the particular circumstances of a given case, cannot be considered effective.” The Commission considered that “the Constitutional Tribunal’s ruling of December 2, 2004 [establishing that only the remedy of an unconstitutionality suit was appropriate to suspend the effects of a parliamentary resolution] was an impediment to the Supreme Court justices’ filing for amparo relief against the resolution whereby their functions were terminated.” 134. The Commission added that “even on the assumption that an unconstitutionality suit could be considered as a suitable and effective remedy for challenging the [alleged] victims’ dismissal, it would have fallen to the Constitutional Tribunal to rule on any such filing.” In this regard, the Commission “consider[ed] that given the way in which they [the new members of the Constitutional Tribunal responsible for processing a possible unconstitutionality suit] were appointed, without a legal or constitutional basis, and without clear rules governing their tenure, the Constitutional Tribunal as it stood in December 2004 did not afford adequate guarantees of independence.” The Commission added that it was “logical to infer that the Constitutional Tribunal so composed [… would have] a direct interest in rejecting any action or remedy concerning the dismissals at the Supreme Court of Justice […], since a favorable decision (against it) would mean that its own appointment was invalid.” Consequently, the Commission stressed that “in such circumstances, there were no guarantees of impartiality in the resolution of a possible unconstitutionality suit.” The Commission therefore considered that “i) the victims were arbitrarily and unreasonably prevented from filing amparo remedies against the National Congress’s dismissal resolution; and ii) the remedy indicated by the Constitutional Tribunal - the unconstitutionality suit- was not suitable for challenging the particular effects of that resolution and, in any event, it was an illusory remedy in light of the absence of independence and impartiality on the part of the authority that would have resolved it.” 135. The representatives pointed out that the amparo remedy “was the remedy offered by the [Ecuadorian] legal system to protect rights,” and emphasized that “in this case, the constitutional action of amparo was the most appropriate way to remedy the violation of the former judges’ human rights.” The representatives added that “(1) amparo remedies were systematically denied to the [Constitutional Tribunal ] judges who were in a similar situation, (2) the judges were threatened if they ruled in favor of amparo suits, (3) the President of the Republic asked the [Constitutional Tribunal] to issue a general resolution 41