denying the amparo remedies, (4) the judges were neither independent nor impartial, (5) an interpretative ruling by the [Supreme Court of Justice] was applied regarding the scope of the amparo that denied its application to resolutions of the National Congress.” 136. In this regard, the representatives argued that the resolution “negat[ed] the efficacy of the amparo and in turn order[ed] the judges to reject amparos whenever these concern[ed] violations of rights stemming from parliamentary actions.” They added that “it was very easy to predict the failure of any constitutional suit given that the body that ultimately heard the appeal of the amparo remedies was precisely the [Constitutional Tribunal], comprised of judges who were absolutely dependent on the government.” 137. As to the action of unconstitutionality to which the judges had access, the representatives argued that “for the purposes of this case, it was not sufficient for the remedy of constitutional amparo to exist in the Constitution or for the Constitutional Tribunal to h[ave] indicated that the unconstitutionality suit was an appropriate means to challenge the decision of Congress”; those remedies also had to be “effective.” The representatives insisted that “the unconstitutionality suit was not effective for two reasons: (1) access and (2) result”. In relation to the first reason, the representatives argued that “the action could only be presented on the initiative of certain State institutions, among them the [Supreme Court of Justice], and with the support of 1,000 people making use of their political rights, […] which ma[de] it difficult to access the remedy.” Regarding the result, the representatives argued that “according to the cited constitutional norms, the purpose of the action [was] to determine whether an administrative norm or action was consistent, in form and substance, with the Constitution” and that “the action of unconstitutionality [did] not offer possibilities of reparation for a right violated, because according to the Ecuadorian system in force at that time, that was the purpose of the amparo.” Accordingly, the representatives concluded that “the judges […] did not have access to a simple and prompt remedy for the protection of their human rights or to an accessible and effective remedy.” 138. The State accepted the violation of this Article of the Convention. 10. Arguments on equality 139. Regarding the alleged violation of Article 24 of the American Convention, the Commission “concluded” that the facts alleged “did not amount to a possible violation of the rights enshrined in Article 24 […] of the American Convention”. 140. The representatives noted that Ecuador “discriminated against the former judges on two occasions: (i) when it dismissed one group of former judges from office and not the other; and, (ii) when it le[ft] the former judges without access to the constitutional guarantee of amparo.” As to the first alleged act of discrimination, the representatives argued that “the National Congress treated the two groups of judges differently,” since “one was a group that the government considered corrupt, inept, and unsuitable for the exercise of its duties, and another group, which was sympathetic to the government, was considered suitable to continue to exercise its duties.” They added that “the parliamentary resolution in which [Congress] dismissed the judges, appointed four of said judges, despite the fact that one of the grounds for dismissal was the supposed expiry of a term applicable to all the former judges.” The reason for such discrimination was apparently “the parliamentary majority’s perception that the judges were politicized.” As to the second alleged cause of discrimination, the representatives argued that the “Constitutional Tribunal, at the request of the President of the Republic, made a distinction between two types of citizens - the former judges and rest of the Ecuadorians,” that this differentiation occurred “for political 42