reasons” and that the result of such differentiation was to “annul the right to judicial protection.” 141. The representatives argued that the discrimination practiced by the State in both cases was not “reasonable”, given that such differences in treatment would not have complied “with the parameters of the judicial guarantees which, as [had been] analyzed, were viol[ated] in an obvious and systematic manner in this case.” They added that there was “no […] objective justification for having dismissed the 28 judges from office or for having denied them the right to judicial protection” and that “the National Congress’ resolution was a completely discriminatory act inasmuch as it was a unique, arbitrary resolution that left a group of people unprotected, in this case the judges, and violated their human rights.” 142. The State acknowledged the violation of this Article of the Convention. B. Considerations of the Court 1. Judicial independence, right to be heard, jurisdiction and political rights 143. In this section, the Court deems it appropriate, first, to refer to the main standards regarding the principle of judicial independence. Second, it will analyze the possible effects on the judicial guarantees of the alleged victims. Third, it will explain the specificities of the institutional aspect of judicial independence in the circumstances of this case. 1(1). General standards on judicial independence 144. In its case law, the Court has indicated that the scope of judicial guarantees and effective judicial protection for judges must be examined in relation to the standards on judicial independence. In the case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, the Court emphasized that judges, unlike other public officials, enjoy specific guarantees due to the independence required of the judiciary, which the Court has understood as “essential for the exercise of the judiciary.” 177 The Court has reiterated that one of the main objectives of the separation of public powers is to guarantee the independence of judges. 178 The purpose of protection is to ensure that the judicial system in general, and its members in particular, are not subject to possible undue restrictions in the exercise their duties by bodies outside the Judiciary, or even by judges who exercise functions of review or appeal. 179 In line with the case law of this Court and of the European Court of Human Rights, and in accordance with the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (hereinafter “Basic Principles” 180), the following guarantees are derived from judicial independence: an 177 Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 30, 2009. Series C No. 197, para. 67, citing Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 2, 2004. Series C No. 107, para. 171, and Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, para. 145. 178 Cf. Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru, para. 73, and Case Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of February 24, 2012. Series C No. 239, para. 186. 179 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, para. 55, and Case Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, para. 186. 180 United Nations Basic Principles regarding the independence of the judiciary adopted by the Seventh Congress of the United Nations on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of the Offender, held in Milan, Italy, from August 26- September 6, 1985, and confirmed by the Assembly General in Resolutions 40/32 of November 29, 1985 and 40/146 of December 13, 1985. 43