“The Supreme Court of Justice has jurisdiction to hear complaints submitted against the judges that comprise it, for the commission of the infractions contemplated in paragraph one of Article 13 of the Organic Law of Judiciary and to rule thereon.” 209 161. Furthermore, in that decision, the Supreme Court ruled that a Committee would be appointed to conduct the procedure, recognized the judge’s right to defend himself, granted the Commission the power to present a report before the plenary of the Supreme Court and to decide by two-thirds of the votes regarding the judge’s dismissal (supra para. 62). According to the information contained in the case file, only one investigation was carried out using this procedure, involving a judge who was accused of having exerted undue influence in the courts of justice. However, although the process was initiated, it was not completed because the judge resigned from his post before the proceeding had concluded (supra para. 62). 162. In accordance with the foregoing, and bearing in mind the State’s acknowledgment that Congress had created an ad-hoc mechanism (supra para. 13), it is possible to conclude that Congress was not authorized to dismiss the Supreme Court justices, given that the new Constitution had removed its power to do so and, furthermore, a proceeding already existed which stipulated the process and grounds on which a judge could be dismissed. Therefore, it is evident that Congress was not the competent authority to decide on the dismissal of the Supreme Court judges. In order to determine the scope of the violations in this case, the Court will proceed to analyze the ad-hoc mechanism used by Congress to dismiss the judges. 1.2.2. Application of Transitory Provision 25 163. If Transitory Provision 25 had been applicable to the judges, it would have complied with one of the permitted reasons for removing judges from office, namely that they had completed their term or period of office (supra paras. 145 to 148). In its final arguments the State, despite its acknowledgement that a punitive ad-hoc mechanism had been used against the judges, insisted that this standard applied to the judges and justified Congress’s option to dismiss them. Thus, the Court deems it necessary to rule on this dispute. 164. Transitory Provision 25 of the Political Constitution of Ecuador, which was in force from August 10, 1998, established that (supra para. 57): “Officials and members of agencies appointed by the National Congress, and the Comptroller General of the State appointed for a four-year period as of August 10, 1998, under the provisions of this Constitution, shall remain in those positions until January 2003.” 165. Based on this provision, the three factual assumptions for considering that an official should have remained in office until January 2003, are the following: i) he must have been appointed by Congress or by the Comptroller General; ii) he must have been appointed “from August 10, 1998”, and iii) he must have been appointed for a four-year period. 166. As regards the application of that provision, in the first place, the Congress designated the justices of the Supreme Court on that single occasion; thereafter, the appointment was to be made using the cooptation system (supra paras. 49 and 56). In second place, the transitory provision stated that it was applicable to officials who had been appointed “from August 10, 1998”. The Court notes that the judges were appointed by Congress on October 2, 1997 and took office on October 6, 1997 (supra para. 53). In other 209 Cf. Official Record No. 182 of October 2, 2003 containing the Resolution of the Supreme Court of Justice of September 24, 2003 (File of attachments to brief of pleadings and motions, volume I, page 2279). 49