II. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT IN THIS CASE 15. According to the proven facts of this case, the dismissal of the members of Ecuador’s three High Courts, namely, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Tribunal and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, occurred as a result of a political arrangement between the then President of the Republic, Lucio Gutiérrez, who was facing impeachment for embezzlement, and the Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano. The leader of this party, former President Abdalá Bucaram, in turn, was seeking the annulment of several criminal proceedings brought against him before the Supreme Court. 16. Thus, on November 23, 2004, President Gutiérrez Borbúa announced his government’s intention to promote, via Congress, the reorganization of the Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Supreme Court of Justice. On November 25, 2004 the National Congress approved a resolution declaring that the full and alternate members of the Constitutional Tribunal had been illegally appointed in 2003 and terminating the appointments of all its full and alternate members, some of whom were subsequently impeached by Congress a few days later. Congress also decided to declare the termination of the duties of the full judges of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and their substitutes, on the grounds that they had been appointed without observing the provisions of Article 209 of the Constitution. 17. On December 1, a first attempt was made to impeach some members of the Constitutional Tribunal, but without securing the necessary votes for their dismissal. For this reason, on December 5, 2004 President Gutiérrez Borbúa summoned the National Congress to a special session on December 8, at which the required number of votes was obtained to censure the former members of the Constitutional Tribunal in an impeachment proceeding. As a second point on the agenda, the Congress also dismissed all the judges of the Supreme Court of Justice, incorrectly applying Transitory Provision 25 of the 1998 Constitution, according to which officials and members of institutions appointed by the National Congress, as of August 10, 1998, for a four-year term, would remain in office until January 2003. These decisions were subsequently revoked by the National Congress, although this did not result in the reinstatement of the dismissed members. 18. It is important to emphasize that the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Leandro Despouy, participated in the settlement of this political and social crisis by issuing several recommendations and monitoring their implementation. At the time, he pointed out that the removal of the judges of the Constitutional Tribunal affected the right of defense and other principles of due process. 18 In relation to the dismissal of the Supreme Court judges, he recognized that the National Congress did not have the authority to remove judges, or to appoint substitutes. 19 19. The importance of taking into account the context lies in the fact that is crucial when deciding which institutional design to implement in a certain place, in order to insulate the judiciary from undue influences. 20 Among the factors that can influence the effective 18 Report E/CN.4/2005/60/Add.4 of March 29, 2005, p. 3. See also Reports A/60/321 of August 31, 2005 and A/HCR/11/41 of March 24, 2009. 19 Idem. 20 MacDonald, Roderick A. and Kong, Hoi, op. cit., p. 846. Similarly, Linares considers that an assessment of judicial independence in a country requires a qualitative knowledge of the political actors and of the relevant matters on which power is exercised. Linares, Sebastián, “La independencia judicial: conceptualización y medición”, 5