affects society as a whole. Likewise, there is a direct connection between the objective dimension of judicial independence and the right of judges to have access to and remain in office, under general conditions of equality, as an expression of their guaranteed tenure.” 67 Thus, “when a judge’s tenure is affected in an arbitrary manner, the right to judicial independence enshrined in Article 8(1) of the American Convention is violated, in conjunction with the right to access and remain in public office, on general terms of equality, established in Article 23(1) (c) of the American Convention.” 68 On this point it is important to stress that this interactive interpretation between Articles 8(1) and 23(1)(c) of the American Convention allows the Inter-American Court to complement its jurisprudence in the case of Reverón Trujillo by specifying that the institutional guarantee of judicial independence, derived from Article 8(1) of the American Convention, translates into a subjective right of the judge to not have his tenure in public office affected in an arbitrary way, within the context of Article 23(1)(c) of the Pact of San Jose. V. THE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECT OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THIS CASE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO DEMOCRACY 55. In this case, the Inter-American Commission argued that in the absence of relevant procedures clearly established by law, it could be inferred that the National Congress acted without offering the necessary guarantees of independence in dismissing the victims. For their part, the representatives concluded that the removal of the judges before completion of their constitutional term, and by decision of an incompetent body, constituted a violation of judicial independence. They also pointed out that, having assumed the role of an “ad hoc” judge, Congress had an obligation to guarantee a person’s right to be heard by an independent judge. Therefore, they argued that the National Congress could hardly guarantee independence, being a political body by nature, and even less so in this case because it responded to the interests of the government and parliamentary majorities. 56. As to the nature of the resolution to dismiss the judges, the Inter-American Commission pointed out that these types of decisions, issued in the absence of a precise legal framework, foster doubts about the ends they pursue, resulting in an implicit sanction of the judicial officials in reprisal for the manner in which they had discharged their duties. In other words, the dismissal was an action aimed at sanctioning the conduct or performance of the Supreme Court justices since the provision invoked by the National Congress was not applicable to the victims. For their part, the representatives argued that the process which concluded with the judges’ dismissal was, in reality, punitive because during the parliamentary sessions Congress used arguments related to the exercise of public office by Ecuador’s highest court. With this action, the National Congress sought to give the appearance that this was not a punitive procedure, but rather the application of a provision that was not observed, thereby equating the judges to any other public official with a fixed term and designated by Congress. 57. Contrary to what the State claimed, in this case no legal grounds were found for the termination of the judges’ term in office. This claim would even be inconsistent with the State’s expression of acquiescence at the public hearing in this case, given that the decision 67 Para. 154 of the Judgment. 68 Ibid. para. 155. 13