2 unwarranted and “extended” opportunity claimed by the respondent Government -in fact, a double opportunity- to avail itself of an objection which exists primarily in its favour seems to militate against the foundations of the system of international protection of human rights; there seems to be here room, on the contrary, for at a time tipping the balance equitably in favour of the alleged victims and strengthening the proper administration of justice and the Convention’s mechanism of protection. 4. The second instance, that is, the reconsideration by the Court of the exhaustion rule previously raised before the Commission, requires further reflection. The point was dwelt upon by the Court in the three Honduran cases (Preliminary Objections, 1987), where the Court did not uphold the Commission’s argument that the Court was prevented from reviewing all aspects pertaining to procedural rules of admissibility of applications. The Court regarded the matter at issue as falling within its (contentious) jurisdiction as it related to the interpretation or application of the Convention; it then decided on its own evaluation to join the question of nonexhaustion to the merits, given the close interplay between the issue of local remedies and the very violation of human rights (cases: “Velásquez Rodríguez”, §§ 28, 84 and 94-96; “Godínez Cruz”, §§ 31, 86 and 96-98; “Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales”, §§ 33, 83 and 93-95). In those cases, the way seems to have been paved for the Court so to decide by the fact that the Commission itself somehow argued that the issue of exhaustion of local remedies was inseparably linked to the merits and to be decided jointly with the latter (cases: “Velásquez Rodríguez”, § 83; “Godínez Cruz”, § 85; “Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales”, § 82).(2) 5. The Court justified that, in the exercise of its contentious jurisdiction, it was competent to decide on all matters relating to the interpretation or application of the American Convention, and those matters comprised the determination of whether there had been a violation of guaranteed rights and the adoption of appropriate measures as well as the interpretation of procedural rules and the verification of compliance with them. In exercising those powers, the Court regarded itself as not bound or restricted by previous decisions of the Commission; the Court added that it did not act as a court of review or appeal of the Commission’s admissibility decisions, but those powers derived from its character as the sole judicial organ in matters concerning the Convention and they further assured States Parties which accepted the Court’s jurisdiction that the Convention provisions would be strictly observed (cases: “Velásquez Rodríguez”, § 29; “Godínez Cruz”, § 32; “Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales”, § 34). Such zealous assertion by the Court of its powers also in relation to aspects pertaining to the preliminary objection to admissibility on the basis of non-exhaustion of local remedies, unlike what it would seem to assume, may not always necessarily ensure or lead to a greater protection of guaranteed human rights. 6. In fact, some cogent reasons appear to militate in favour of taking, on this particular point, a distinct position, more consonant with, and conducive to, the fulfillment of the ultimate object and purpose of the American Convention, insofar as (2) This outlook is reminiscent of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (inaugurated in the De Wilde,Ooms and Versyp Judgement, 1971) to the effect that the Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of all questions of fact and of law pertaining to the matter of nonexhaustion of local remedies insofar as that objection had first been raised before the Commission. This thesis, however, has not passed without some dissent within the European Court itself, not only in that leading case, but also in the more recent cases in which it has been upheld by the Court (Brozicek, 1989; Cardot, 1991; Oberschlick, 1991).