VI.1. RIGHT TO PERSONAL LIBERTY AND TO THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF MR. ROMERO FERIS 73. In this chapter, the Court will refer to the arguments regarding the alleged victim’s right to personal liberty and his right to the presumption of innocence. The Court will also refer to the lawfulness of the deprivation of liberty (Article 7(2) of the Convention), to the abitrariness of the pre-trial detention and to the presumption of innocence (Articles 7(3), 7(5) and 8(2)) of the alleged victim and, finally, to an effective judicial remedy related to the unlawfulness of the arrest or pre-trial detention (Article 7(6)). A. Lawfulness of the pre-trial detention of Mr. Romero Feris A.1. Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 74. The Commission claimed that the duration of the alleged victim’s pre-trial detention did not respect the provisions of the applicable legislation, which is a violation of Article 7(2) of the Convention. It made this assertion because the alleged victim was deprived of his liberty for one month and eight days more than the legal maximum of two years, which may be extended for one year, and five months more than the period of extension of pre-trial detention. The representative coincided with this position. 75. The State pointed out that, with respect to the duration of the pre-trial detention of the alleged victim and its conformity with the applicable legislation, the domestic court had applied the benefit known as “2x1” that was available under Law 24,390 and that consisted in counting two days of prison for each day of pre-trial detention, which would have exceeded the two years. It indicated that any harm caused by the alleged excess of pre-trial detention had been remedied by including that period when calculating the full term of the sentence. A.2. Considerations of the Court 76. The Court has held that the essence of Article 7 of the Convention is the protection of the liberty of the individual from all arbitrary or unlawful interference by the State.100 It has explained that this article has two distinct types of regulations: one general and the other specific. The general is found in the first clause: “[e]very person has the right to personal liberty and security”; while the specific is comprised of a series of guarantees that protect the right not to be unlawfully (Article 7(2)) or arbitrarily (Article 7(3)) deprived of liberty; to be informed of the reasons for the detention and of the charges brought against the person detained (Article 7(4)); to the judicial control of deprivation of liberty (Article 7(5)) and to contest the lawfulness of the detention (Article 7(6)).101 Thus, any violation of the clauses 2 through 7 of Article 7 of the Convention necessarily results in a violation of Article 7(1). 77. Article 7(2) establishes that “[n]o one may be deprived of his physical liberty except for reasons and under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the State Party concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto.” This provision recognizes the principal guarantee to the right to physical liberty: the legal exception, according to which the Cf. Case of the "Juvenile Reeducation Instituter" v. Paraguay. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 3, 2004. Series C No. 112, para. 223 and Case of Herrera Espinoza et al. v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 1, 2016. Series C No. 316, para. 131. 100 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 51 and Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of April 25, 2018. Series C No. 354, para. 351. 101 14