82. The Court considers that the State’s argument that the period in excess of the lawful maximum for pre-trial detention was computed taking into account the so-called “2x1” benefit under Law N° 24,390, which consisted in counting two days of imprisonment for each day of pre-trial detention, would have exceeded the two years is not sufficient to justify the failure to comply with the provisions of the law and with the judicial decisions since, although it favors the alleged victim who was eventually convicted, in light of the principle of legal reserve and the principle of the presumption of innocence it does not make lawful a measure that has not complied with the domestic laws. Moreover, that argument ignores the precautionary nature of pre-trial detention by justifying it as a punishment, as a sanction, despite its initial purpose that is closely related to the development of the process, which would also be contrary to the principle of the presumption of innocence. 83. The Court, thus, finds that the State infringed Article 7(1) and 7(2) of the Convention to the detriment of Mr. Romero Feris by maintaining him in pre-trial detention for a period greater than that ordered by the Examining Magistrate and for more than the maximum period of the extension, which was a year, as established in Law N° 24,390. B. The alleged arbitrariness of the deprivation of liberty and the presumption of innocence of Mr. Romero Feris B.1. Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 84. The Commission claimed that the August 1, 2001 decision of the First Magistrate, which indicated that the pre-trial detention should be maintained and extended, violated the right to personal liberty and to the presumption of innocence established in Articles 7(3), 7(5) and 8(2) of the Convention. Specifically, the Commission stressed that the magistrate took into account the fact that the sentence that the alleged victim could have received was a maximum of 25 years, which could have increased the risk that he would not appear for trial. The Commission also recalled that pre-trial detention can only be based on procedural reasons, such as risk of flight or obstruction of the process, and that the organs of the interAmerican system have indicated that an eventual sentence cannot be used as an element to determine the risk of flight. With respect to the other considerations of the Magistrate in granting the extension to the detention that related to: (a) the imminence of a trial and (b) the statements of the alleged victim on the lack of independence and impartiality of the judicial authorities, the Commission claimed that the holding of public hearings or trials, which are stages of all proceedings, cannot be used to maintain pre-trial detention since, in practice, such a precautionary measure would be the rule and not the exception. It also argued that the filing of recourses in the context of a criminal trial cannot be used to prejudice the accused, nor can it be a justification to maintain pre-trial detention. 85. The representative coincided with the arguments of the Commission and added that the decision of August 2, 1999 of the Second Examining Magistrate that ordered the initial detention of the alleged victim infringed the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of liberty because it was not substantiated. 86. The State asserted that the magistrate made an exhaustive assessment of the reasonability, necessity and proportionality of the measure. The magistrate stated that he had considered the possible sanction, the number and complexity of the crimes attributed to the alleged victim and, especially, his conduct during the relevant judicial proceedings where he made evasive and contradictory statements when being questioned. The State also argued that it was not for the Inter-American Court to evaluate whether the risks noted by the Examining Magistrate are justified by the elements that he had available, since the Court does not act as an appellate court of domestic decisions. 16