to be the direct perpetrators of the crime of kidnapping or abduction committed against P. A. L. W. 7. The petitioners claim that by imposing a capital sentence on Ronald Ernesto Raxacacó Reyes, the Guatemalan State has incurred in a violation of the right to life, to a fair trial, to effective legal protection, to humane treatment, and to indemnification for miscarriages of justice, as set forth in Articles 4, 8, 25, 5, and 10 of the American Convention. The petitioners further claim that the Guatemalan State failed to comply with its obligation of respecting those rights and adopting domestic legislative provisions, as required by Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention. 8. With respect to the right to life, the petitioners hold that the State of Guatemala violated Article 4(2) in that the alleged victim was sentenced to death for a crime–kidnapping or abduction not entailing death–that at the time that Guatemala ratified the American Convention (May 25, 1978) was not punishable by the death sentence, but merely by a prison term of between 8 and 15 years; 2 and that the death sentence was thus imposed for a crime that, by its very nature, cannot be considered among the most serious offenses. Moreover, the petitioners report that in May 2000, the Guatemalan Congress repealed Decree 159, the provision establishing the mechanism for clemency appeals to the President of the Republic, in contravention of Article 4(6) of the Convention. 9. As regards the right to a fair trial and effective legal protection, the petitioners claim that those provisions were violated in that the “obligatory death sentence” is the only punishment applicable to kidnapping under Guatemalan law. Because of this, the petitioners claim that defendants are denied the right to be tried by an independent and impartial judge; to prepare an adequate defense and to present evidence; and to have access to effective remedies before a court of law. 10. With respect to the right to humane treatment, the petitioner claims that the State of Guatemala has inflicted moral suffering on the alleged victim, a form of treatment forbidden under that article, in that Ronald Ernesto Raxacacó Reyes is being kept on death row. 11. As regards the right to compensation, the petitioner claims that the State of Guatemala violated that provision in that the possibility of detecting a miscarriage of justice and of compensating the alleged victim for such an error is illusory, because the obligatory death sentence does not offer any real possibilities for exercising the right enshrined in the aforesaid Article 10. 12. Finally, with respect to the requirement of previously exhausting all available domestic remedies, the petitioners maintain that Mr. Raxacacó Reyes’s defense pursued all the remedies offered by Guatemalan law. Thus, the petitioner notes that on September 13, 1999, the Fourth Chamber of the Appeals Court dismissed a special appeal remedy brought by the defense; that on June 20, 2000, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court ruled that an appeal for annulment filed on behalf of the alleged victim was inadmissible; and that on July 28, 2001, the Constitutional Court dismissed an amparo constitutional relief suit filed against the decision that had ruled the appeal for annulment inadmissible. 2 Article 201 (Kidnapping or Abduction) of Decree 17/73 of 1973, in force when Guatemala ratified the American Convention, read as follows:Kidnappings or abductions with the intent of obtaining ransoms, exchanges of third parties, or other similar or comparable illegal purposes shall be punishable by a prison term of between eight and fifteen years. The perpetrators thereof shall be punished by the death sentence when, as a result of or during the kidnapping or abduction, the kidnapped person dies.In turn, Article 201 (amended) of Decree 81/96, currently in force and under which the alleged victim was sentenced to capital punishment, provides that:Those who mastermind or perpetrate the crime of kidnapping or abduction against one or more victims, with the intent of securing ransoms, exchanges of persons, the adoption of any decision contrary to the will of the kidnapped person, or any other similar or like purpose, shall receive the death sentence and, when this cannot be imposed, shall be sent to prison for a period of between twenty-five and fifty years. In such cases, no extenuating circumstances shall be admitted. Accomplices and accessories thereto shall be punished by a prison term of between twenty and forty years. 2