8. Thus, in relation to the right to personal integrity, the Court referred to the acts that constituted torture and ill-treatment during the raids and detentions and, in particular, examined the sexual violence and torture suffered by women, the situation of the children who were affected in the case, and the measures of solitary confinement. It also referred to the detention conditions, but only as regards the size of the cells and the absence of beds. In the latter case, it indicated that “the alleged victims who were taken to the PTJ were detained in small cells, without beds, which forced them to sleep on the floor, and they did not have access to bathrooms […]; therefore, it finds that there was a situation of overcrowding contrary to the personal integrity of the persons detained in the PTJ.” 35 9. Then, in relation to the right to health, the Court took into consideration four circumstances: (i) the lack of medical attention for Patricia Gallardo, which had a negative effect on her physical and mental condition during her house arrest; (ii) the delay in providing medical attention to Genaro Ahuacho Luna, which might have had an impact on his death; (iii) the failure to conduct a medical examination at the time of the detention of Blas Valencia Campos, Edwin Rodríguez Alarcón, Gabriel Valencia Alarcón, Alexis Valencia Alarcón, Claudio Centeno Valencia, Elacio Peña Córdoba, Genaro Ahuacho Luna, Alfredo Bazán la Rosas, Mauricio Valenzuela Valencia, Oswaldo Lulleman Antezana, Raúl Oswaldo Lulleman Gutiérrez, Luis Lulleman Gutiérrez, Carlos Eladio Cruz Añez and Patricia Catalina Gallardo Ardúz, and (iv) the lack of medical attention for F.E.P.M. following her miscarriage “as a result of the beating she suffered at the hands of police agents.” 36 10. Therefore, even though the facts mentioned all constituted violations of the right to personal integrity and even to life because the failure to guarantee the obligations of assessment, care and treatment had an impact on the physical and mental condition of the victims, the Court chose to compartmentalize its analysis, excluding the relationship between those facts and the obligations arising from Articles 5 and 1(1) of the Convention. 11. This new reasoning adopted by the Court for the first time in a contentious case does not suppose a merely rhetorical differentiation. To the contrary, analyzing the obligation of medical assessment, care and treatment of persons deprived of liberty only in light of Article 26 of the Convention may have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the orders issued by the Court. As I indicated in my recent opinion in Advisory Opinion 29, “[i]t is natural that the juridical inconsistencies of the concept of the justiciability of the ESCER, […], are transferred to the standards for the minimum conditions of detention and that, in this way, the degree of efficacy that the States have is reduced. Although a majority within the Court have opted for the justiciability of Article 26, the Court should take into account that, internally, discussions still exist on the binding nature of the obligations arising from this article.” 37 12. Based on the above, I believe that this judgment could have been more effective and legitimate if it had upheld its case law associated with Article 5 of the Convention. On the one hand, because there would be no doubt about the content, binding nature, and justiciability of the obligation to provide medical assessment, care and treatment to prisoners as part of the minimum conditions of imprisonment; on the other, because compliance with the obligation would not depend on the State’s financial capacity. It should not be overlooked that Article 1(1) read in relation to Case of Valencia Campos v. Bolivia, paras. 197 ff. Case of Valencia Campos v. Bolivia, paras. 242 ff. 37 Differentiated approaches with respect to certain groups of persons in detention (Interpretation and scope of Articles 1(1), 4(1), 5, 11(2), 12, 13, 17(1), 19, 24 and 26 of the American Convention on Human Rights and other human rights instruments). Advisory Opinion OC-29/22 of May 30, 2022. Series A No 29. Concurring opinion of Judge Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto. Para. 8. 35 36 4