to accept or reject it, not with reference to the legislation in force at the time the petitions were filed, but with respect to the aforementioned laws which, I repeat, were not in force at that time. Thus, what the judgment ultimately did was to control the conventionality of the provisions of Laws N°. 8503, of 2006, and 8837, of 2011, distinguishing between the petitions that complied with the provisions of the former and those that did not, 33 forgetting that said law does not establish the obligation to file the appeals that it contemplates. 34 In short, the judgment did not consider the possibility that the petitioners could raise - if they so wished, and at the appropriate time - the potential non-compliance with the provisions of said laws as a matter totally different from the one resolved in the case before this Court. Likewise, this case was dealt with simultaneously by the domestic jurisdiction and the international jurisdiction, as shown by all the appeals filed in the cases ultimately considered by the judgment, 35 between the time when the petitions were filed, that is, between March 2004 and November 2006, and when their admissibility was decided, on July 22, 2011, which is clearly not in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. It should also be noted that there is no record of the “initial study and processing” of the petition provided for in the applicable regulations or, indeed, of the 4 to 6 years that the Commission took to rule on admissibility, thus allowing the above situation to occur. In synthesis, the instant case is a clear demonstration of how inappropriate it is to have demanded proof of compliance with the requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies, or that such requirement was not applicable, at the time the Commission ruled on the admissibility of these petitions and not when they were lodged, as provided for in the Convention. Therefore, in light of the above considerations, I disagree with the provisions of the first and sixth operative paragraphs 36 of the judgment and, for these same reasons, I agree with the provisions of the twelfth and nineteenth operative paragraphs of the judgment. 37. 33 Paras. 48 to 57. 34 “Persons convicted of a criminal act prior to the date of this Law, who have been prevented from petitioning for a writ of reversal on cassation against the judgment, due to the rules that regulated its admissibility at that time, may seek a review of the conviction before the competent court, invoking, in each case, the grievance and the factual and legal aspects that could not be heard in cassation.” Para. 46. 35 Para. 172 and ff. 36 Supra, Note N° 7. “12.The State is not responsible for the violation of the right to appeal the judgment contained in Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 8(1) thereof, to the detriment of Group 2 (Rafael Rojas Madrigal), Group 3 (Luis Archbold Jay and Enrique Archbold Jay), Group 4 (Jorge Martínez Meléndez) and Group 7 (Miguel Mora Calvo) in the terms of paragraphs 255 to 345 of this judgment. 13. The State is not responsible for the violation of the right to an impartial judge established in Article 8(1) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Group 4 (Jorge Martínez Meléndez) and the Group 2 (Rafael Rojas Madrigal) and the Group 7 (Miguel Mora Calvo), pursuant to paragraphs 383 to 417 and 456 of this judgment. 37 15