requirement has been met with respect to the violations alleged by the petitioners in the judicial proceedings involving Mr. Tristán Donoso: 18. With respect to the arguments on the violations of Mr. Tristán Donoso’s right to not be subject to arbitrary and abusive interference with his private life (Article 11) and the rights to due process (Article 8) and judicial protection (Article 25), the petitioners allege that Mr. Tristán Donoso exhausted domestic remedies, and specifically that he pursued the appropriate remedy, which was decided by the Supreme Court of Justice on December 3, 1999. The State agreed with the petitioners that this process concluded with the dismissal with prejudice of the charges against the Attorney General, on the date indicated. The IACHR concludes that this remedy was exhausted in keeping with Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention. 19. With respect to the alleged violation of the right to freedom of expression (Article 13), the IACHR notes that the parties have different positions on the exhaustion of domestic remedies. On the one hand, the State argues that domestic remedies have not been exhausted, since the criminal proceedings for slander and libel initiated by the Attorney General against Mr. Tristán Donoso had not yet concluded. The State adduced that this criminal proceeding, which it considers a “remedy,” had not been exhausted, and that “the corresponding appeals are pending.” It further considered that there are no objective causes exempting the petitioner from this requirement, since the criminal proceeding was still under way. The IACHR notes that despite these assertions, the State did not indicate any circumstance to justify the adequacy or effectiveness of such a “remedy.” Not did it point to the existence of any other domestic remedy adequate to address the alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention, although it affirms, as do the petitioners, that Mr. Tristán Donoso exhausted two constitutional challenges, which were rejected in due course by the Supreme Court. 20. The petitioners have set forth two arguments which in the view of the IACHR are different: First, they understand that it is illogical and legally anomalous to require that a person exhaust the domestic remedies within a proceeding to which that person objects ab initio and entirely. In this sense, the petitioners consider that the slander and libel trial brought by public officials represents in its entirety a violation of the freedom of expression of Panamanian citizens derived from a law contrary to the Convention, as is the case of desacato laws. Accordingly, they consider that the victim need not exhaust a remedy against a proceeding which by its nature is illegal, and which is unfolding in the context of a generalized violation of the right to freedom of expression. Moreover, they add that the constitutional challenge filed by the victim against the “desacato laws” was the only real opportunity to fight the provisions of a desacato law, and that remedy was not admitted by the Supreme Court of Justice on May 24, 2000. Accordingly, this remedy has been exhausted in keeping with Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention. The petitioners’ second argument is considerably different: They understand that they must apply the exceptions provided for in Article 46(2)(a) of the Convention, and they ask that the petitioners be exempted from the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies, which, in practice, cannot attain their objectives, for the reasons set forth above. 5 21. The Inter-American Court has indicated that when a State alleges failure to exhaust domestic remedies, it has the burden to specify the domestic remedies that must be exhausted, and to show that they are adequate and effective. 6 With respect to the distribution of the burden of proof, the IACHR reiterates that if the State that alleges failure to exhaust proves the existence of specific domestic remedies that should have been pursued, it will be up to the petitioner to show that said remedies were or were not exhausted, or that one of the exceptions provided for in Article 46(2) of the Convention applies. 5 See para. 11. 6 IACHR, Report Nº 02/01, Case 11.280, Juan Carlos Bayarri, Argentina, January 19, 2001. Para. 30. The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights has said repeatedly that “the State claiming non-exhaustion has an obligation to prove that domestic remedies remain to be exhausted and that they are effective.” See Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987 Series C Nº 1, para. 88; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987 Series C Nº 2, para. 8; Godínez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987 Series C Nº 3, para. 90; Gangaram Panday Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of December 4, 1991 Series C Nº 12, para. 38; Neira Alegría et al. Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of December 11, 1991 Series C Nº 13, para. 30; Castillo Páez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of January 30, 1996 Series C Nº 24, para. 40; Loayza Tamayo Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of January 31, 1996, Series C Nº 25, para. 40; Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Articles 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90, August 10, 1990 Series A Nº 11, para. 41. 5