7 26. In the democratic criminal process, the defendant, subject of the process, invested with procedural rights that allow it to hold and ensure its material rights, faces certain charges over which he awaits a judicial decision. Based on them, which are the “matter of the trial”, it develops the acts of the defense. Thus the importance that he know, from the beginning of the process –and even more so, from the beginning of the process against him and since he is detained prior to his presentation before the judge--, the acts he is charged with, in order to be able to prepare his defense. This does not mean he must be informed of technical matters regarding the charges against him, but instead certainty regarding –and of course that his defense counsel also be informed—what acts are attributed to him, how they are said to be committed, how they were carried out, etcetera, so that he may have the necessary elements to contradict the indictment and, in the end, obtain a fair judgment. 27. The above not only substantiates the demand for precise, complete, and opportune information regarding the accusation –which is a fundamental right of the defendant, a crucial part of the due process, without which the condition of the defendant as subject of the trial to be reinstated as object of the investigation is declined--, but also the essential relationship that must exist between the indictment that presents the subject of the process and the judgment that decides this matter, not another or others that could be related to it, but that in any case were not subject of the evidence, the debate, the defense, and therefore could only be, in any case, matters for a different process in which the corresponding guarantees of information and defense are observed. 28. The conviction that the defendant must know, from the time of his arrest, the charges against him –not just their technical names, that say little or nothing to the common individual, but the acts that are being attributed--, has installed itself in the modern procedure of democratic orientation. It is found, for example, in the demand that those who arrest the alleged offender inform him of the charges, of the possibility to refer to them, to remain silent, and to appoint a defense counsel. The similar must occur when the defendant appears before the judge of his cause. The same norm must be observed –as already mentioned—when the subject is a foreigner and he is notified of the possibility to resort to the assistance of the consul of his nationality. 29. In my opinion, nothing should oppose what the State law calls reclassification of the facts, that is, their observation from another technical perspective, under a classification or designation different to the one initially given, but keeping their identity invariable, as the matter or subject of the process. In this case the defense made and that continues to be made by the defendant and his defense counsel continues to be valid, because it has referred and refers to facts that have not been altered, changed, or increased, instead they have simply been designated with other terms. Said in another way: the facts are not altered; the only thing that changes is the nomen juris with which they are designated, and this variation does not have an effect different to that of a technical depuration in the use of concepts, but it does not affect the defense. Up to here, if we talk of a reclassification of the facts. And if things remain here, there is no violation to the right to a defense. 30. This is designated prosecutor channeling not what happens if what the judgment of the Inter-American Court has as “factual basis” of the criminal process is modified. If this occurs, the that makes a new accusation must promote the acts that lead to a reof the process and, if it does not suggest it, the court itself must