his or her life as a consequence of the use of force by law enforcement officers without the aforementioned requirements being met, that fact shall be tantamount to arbitrary deprivation of life.65 For its part, the Court has pointed out that those requirements entail: i) Legitimate purpose: the use of force must be addressed at achieving a legitimate purpose. (...) ii) Absolute necessity: it is necessary to verify whether other less harmful means exist to safeguard the life and integrity of the person or situation that it is sought to protect, according to the circumstances of the case. The Court has indicated that it cannot be concluded that the requirement of “absolute necessity” to use force against a person has been met when such a person does not represent a direct danger, “even when the failure to use force results in the loss of the opportunity to capture them.” (...) iii) Proportionality: the level of force used must be in accordance with the level of resistance offered, which implies establishing a balance between the situation that the agent is facing and his response, considering the potential harm that could be caused. Thus, agents must apply a standard of differentiated use of force, determining the level of cooperation, resistance, or aggressiveness of the person involved and, on this basis, use tactics of negotiation, control or use of force, as appropriate.66 63. In the instant case, although there are differing versions regarding certain details of the chase and what happened after the vehicle stopped, there is no disputing that: i) on March 31, 1997, Walter Huacón and Mercedes Salazar were in a vehicle being chased by six officer agents; ii) during the chase a number of officers fired shots; and iii) Mr. Huacón and Ms. Salazar died as the result of shots fired by those police officers. 64. Given that those police officers were on duty, according to the burden of proof rules described with respect to lethal use of force, it is up to the State to provide a satisfactory explanation of what happened and to show that there was strict compliance with said requirements in this concrete case. The Commission stressed that, in the international proceedings, the Ecuadorian State did not provide an explanation conducive to a conclusion that the deaths of Mr. Huacón and Ms. Salazar constituted legitimate use of force, nor does the case file support such a conclusion. 65. On the contrary, in the information available there is nothing indicating that either Mr. Huacón or Ms. Salazar were armed or committed any act of aggression that could be interpreted as posing a threat to the police officers taking part in the chase, or any acts of violence that posed a threat to their lives that might have warranted the use of lethal armed forces as a last and necessary resort in that situation. Here, the Commission again points out that the only legitimate use of firearms in cases of a danger of a person fleeing is when someone's life is in danger.67 That circumstance was not present in the instant case. 66. Furthermore, it transpires from police and experts' reports and witness testimony that i) some of the police officers fired shots at the upper part of the vehicle, one of which hit Ms. Salazar in the thorax; and ii) after the vehicle stopped, officer Carbo fired two shots at Mr. Huacón, one in the leg and the other at his chin, and two shots at Ms. Salazar's chest. The IACHR observes that all that was not contested by the State. In short, it is abundantly clear from the file that shots were fired indiscriminately at the vehicle -- hitting and killing Ms. Salazar -- for the simple reason that the vehicle was being driven down the wrong side of the road: an act that is manifestly illegitimate, unnecessary, and disproportionate. The same conclusion applies to the shots after the vehicle had stopped that wounded and ultimately killed Mr. Huacón, since nothing is explained in the file that could warrant the lethal use of force against him. 67. In light of the above determination of the facts, the Commission considers that it is clearly demonstrated that the use of lethal force by the police officers was unjustified, unnecessary, disproportionate, and lacking any legitimate purpose, and therefore constitutes extrajudicial executions. Consequently, the IACHR concludes that the Ecuadorian State violated the right to life of Walter Gonzalo Huacón Baidal and Mercedes Eugenia Salazar Cueva established in Article 4.1 of the American Convention, in conjunction with Article 1.1 thereof. IACHR. Report No. 1/96. Case 10,559. Chumbivilcas. Peru, March 1, 1996; and Report No. 34/00. Case 11.291, Carandiru, Brazil. April 13, 2000, paras. 63-67. 66 I/A Court H.R., Case of Landaeta Mejías Brothers et al v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of August 27, 2014. Series C No. 281, par. 134. 67 IACHR. Report No. 114/18. Case 12.722. Merits. Pedro Basilio Roche Azaña et al Nicaragua. October 5, 2018, par. 53. 65 9