49 * * * 99. The Court must point out that it is a proven fact (supra para. 95(t)) that in a judgment the Criminal Trial Court of the First Judicial Circuit of San José delivered on November 12, 1999, Mr. Mauricio Herrera Ulloa was convicted of having committed the crime of publishing offenses constituting defamation. As a consequence of this judgment, under the civil suit for damages Mr. Mauricio Herrera Ulloa and the newspaper “La Nación” S.A., represented by Mr. Fernán Vargas Rohrmoser, were declared jointly and severally liable in that suit. 100. The civil consequences of the criminal conviction that fell directly upon Mr. Fernán Vargas Rohrmoser were in his capacity as “La Nación’s” legal representative, as it was through this vehicle of the mass media that journalist Mauricio Herrera Ulloa exercised his right to freedom of expression. Hence, the subsidiary civil penalties established in the criminal judgment are directed against the newspaper “La Nación” S.A., whose legal representative vis-à-vis third parties is Mr. Vargas Rohrmoser. Those penalties were not targeted at Mr. Vargas Rohrmoser as a private subject or individual. X VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 IN RELATION TO ARTICLES 1(1) AND 2 (FREDOM OF THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION) Pleadings of the Commission 101. With regard to Article 13 of the Convention, the Commission argued the following: 101(1) With regard to the scope of the right to freedom of thought and expression and its role within a democratic society: a) Article 13 has two dimensions: the individual, which is realized through the right to express thoughts and ideas and the right to receive them; and the social dimension, a means to share ideas and information for mass communication among human beings. Both dimensions must be guaranteed simultaneously. The articles written by journalist Mauricio Herrera Ulloa involved both dimensions of freedom of expression; b) any restrictions on freedom of expression must be intended to serve some pressing social need. When faced with a number of alternatives, the one chosen must be the one least restrictive of the protected right; furthermore, the restriction must be proportionate to the interest that justifies it; and c) it is not enough for a restriction of a Convention-protected right to be useful to obtaining some legitimate end; rather, “it must be necessary, which means that it must be shown that it cannot reasonably be achieved through a means less restrictive.”