a real possibility that the State could respond to the presumed human right violations alleged by Azul Rojas Marín.” Pursuant to the principle of subsidiarity, the State argued that it “should not be found internationally responsible while a process to address the violations alleged by the presumed victim was underway.” The Commission pointed out that “in order for the Court, when examining the merits, not to declare the State’s responsibility based on an argument of complementarity, the State must recognize the internationally wrongful act and assess whether this has ceased and whether it has made full reparation for the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted it.” The Commission argued that the elements that would indicate the admissibility of the argument of complementarity did not exist in this case, and therefore asked the Court to reject the preliminary objection. The representatives argued that: “(i) the State has based itself on an erroneous interpretation of the principle of subsidiarity, and (ii) the State had already had the opportunity to investigate the facts and punish those who were responsible, but did not do so.” B.2 Considerations of the Court 28. Owing to the complementary nature of the inter-American system, the Court has considered it pertinent not to declare the responsibility of the State if, when hearing the case, the State has put an end to the violation and redressed the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted it.27 In this case, the State has opened a new investigation into the facts. However, the Court notes that, in the context of this new investigation, it was decided not to annul the dismissal that had been ordered, and the rights that were presumably violated have not been redressed. Therefore, the conditions required in order not to examine State responsibility have not been met. 29. Consequently, the Court declares the preliminary objection filed by the State inadmissible. C. Preliminary objection of “fourth instance” C.1 Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 30. The State argued that the Commission had acted as “a court of fourth instance when classifying the sexual violence suffered by Azul Rojas Marín as torture in its Merits Report, because this classification corresponds to the domestic authorities.” It therefore asked the Court to conduct a control of the legality of the Commission’s action. The Commission argued that “the Peruvian State has not proved that the minimum assumptions exist for [executing a possible control of the legality of its actions].” The representatives clarified that it was not asking the Court to review the ruling of a domestic court; rather they were arguing that a series of acts and omissions of the Peruvian State constituted violations of the rights contained in the Convention. C.2 Considerations of the Court 31. The Court has established that, when assessing compliance with certain international obligations, there may be an intrinsic interrelationship between the analysis of international law and domestic law. Therefore, the determination of whether or not the actions of judicial Cf., mutatis mutandis, Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits and reparations. Judgment of November 30, 2012. Series C No. 259, para. 171; Case of Duque v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 26, 2016. Series C No. 310, para. 137, and Case of Colindres Schonenberg v. El Salvador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 4, 2019. Series C No. 373, para. 75. 27 10