in which a similar situation occurs. Thus, it corresponds to the Court, in exercise of its inherent power to determine the scope of its own competence (compétence de la compétence),13 to determine in each case the need to verify the facts, as they were presented by the parties, or by taking into account other elements of the body of evidence. 17. In this case, the State has not participated or carried out any procedural activity, either in the context of these proceedings, or during the processing of the provisional measures before this Court. The State’s only intervention in relation to this case was at a hearing before the Commission in 2008, when the State acknowledge the facts of the case, indicating that it “acknowledged that, on June 24, human rights had been violated” and that most of the facts denounced by Mr. Fleury had been proved following an administrative investigation.14 Over and above the possible prejudice that the State’s lack of participation could cause it, this inactivity before an international human rights jurisdiction is contrary to the object and purpose of the American Convention and the mechanism of collective guarantee established therein.15 Moreover, the acknowledgement before the Commission becomes fully effective in the proceedings before the Court. 18. In order to deliver this judgment, the Court finds, in function of Article 39(2) of its Rules of Procedure, that the State has accepted the facts described in the application, together with the facts that may be considered complementary16 presented by the representatives. 19. Consequently, taking into account its powers to ensure the enhanced protection of human rights, the Court will deliver a judgment in which it determines the facts and the evidence with regard to the merits of the matter, as well as the corresponding reparations.17 B. Alleged victims 20. In addition to the next of kin indicated in the application (supra para. 3), the representatives asked that Rosine Fénelon, Lysias Fleury’s mother, be declared a victim and receive reparations for having suffered “physical, mental and moral harm,” because she witnessed when her son was arrested and beaten by police agents, and they alleged that this could have contributed to her death within three months, because of the stress and anguish she suffered that day. In addition, they asked for reparations in favor of Willy Benoit, Mr. Fleury’s brother-in-law, who had suffered “serious mental and moral harm” upon witnessing Mr. Fleury’s arrest and had been forced to abandon his home for fear of reprisals by police agents from the Bon Repos Police Station. 13 Cf. Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru. Competence. Judgment of September 24, 1999. Series C No. 54, para. 32, and Case of the Dos Erres Massacre v. Guatemala. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 24, 2009. Series C No. 211, para. 44. 14 Minutes of Hearing No. 10 of March 7, 2008, 131st session of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the case of Lysias Fleury v. Haiti (file of attachments to the application, tome I, folio 128). 15 Cf. Case of Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 11, 2005. Series C No. 123, para. 38. Cf. Case of the “Five Pensioners” v. Peru, supra note 9, para. 153, and Case of Barbani Duarte et al. v. Uruguay, supra note 9, para. 36. 16 17 Cf. Case of the Mapiripán Massacre v. Colombia. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 134, para. 69, and Case of Torres Millacura et al. v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 26, 2011. Series C No. 229, para. 37. 8