VII-1 RIGHT TO JUDICIAL GUARANTEES, 46 EQUAL PROTECTION,47 AND JUDICIAL PROTECTION,48 IN RELATION TO THE OBLIGATIONS TO RESPECT AND GUARANTEE RIGHTS49 AND THE DUTY TO ADOPT DOMESTIC LEGAL EFFECTS 50 A. Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 44. The Commission recalled that “ensuring reparation for the violation of an international obligation of the State—such as a restriction on personal liberty—is not optional, but mandatory,” for which reason Law 24,043 merely regulates a special procedure to fulfill this obligation. It likewise noted that the law “does not seek to cover all cases of human rights violations that occurred under the country’s last civil-military dictatorship, and therefore the exclusion of some kinds of cases from the terms of the law is not per se a violation of the right to equal protection under the law, provided that said exclusion responds to an objective and reasonable justification and is proportional to the aims sought.” It argued, however, that the exclusion of the de facto supervised release to which Mr. Almeida was subjected violated the right to equal protection, as the State did not provide an explanation for why that exclusion was objective and reasonable. 45. The Commission noted that this situation was generally corrected subsequently with an interpretation issued through the Robasto case. However, it underscored that this change in the stance of domestic authorities did not benefit Mr. Almeida. Effectively, even though he filed for remedies both administratively and in the judicial system to obtain the reparation based on these new interpretive criteria, his claims were rejected based on a procedural consideration under which the situation in his case was one of res judicata that prevented further review. It therefore concluded that the State “is responsible for the violation of the right to judicial protection set forth under Article 25(1) of the American Convention, read together with the right to equal protection under the law provided for in Article 24 [...].” 46. The representative agreed with the Commission’s conclusions in its Report on the Merits. She underscored that, despite the change in operating criteria following the Robasto case and the revisions on handling evidence, “this criteria was questioned again and again by the State itself, leading to unequal treatment depending on the point in history and the Minister of Justice and Human Rights in charge of the portfolio." In the final arguments, she indicated that because "restrictive application of law 24,043 to exclude [the case of Mr. Almeida], Article 24 of the Convention was violated, and because there were no adequate domestic remedies for restoring the right violated, Article 25(1) of the Convention was also violated.” 47. The State recognized its responsibility for the violation of articles 24 and 25(1) in relation to articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention; however, it highlighted "the marked exceptionality of Mr. Almeida's case, which did not properly reflect the change in the criteria of the Argentine justice system and administration, under which for several years new situations like his have been covered under the supervised release described by Law 24,043.” In its final arguments, it added that application of the precedent set by the Supreme Court in the Noro case to judicial and administrative matters “has had the result that is ultimately being required under the American Convention and that is here in at issue: the equitable application of Law 24,043 with regard to both de jure and de facto supervised release. 46 Article 8(1) of the Convention. 47 Articles 1(1) and 24 of the Convention. 48 Article 25(1) of the Convention. 49 Article 1(1) of the Convention. 50 Article 2 of the Convention. 14