ensuring the judicial control of the deprivation of liberty.” 435 In addition, in relation to the nature of such remedies at the domestic level, the Court has underscored that these “must not only exist formally by law, but must be effective; that is, they must comply with the purpose of obtaining a prompt decision on the lawfulness of the arrest or detention.” 436 377. In this specific case, the Court notes that article 8.2.g) of the 1994 Constitution established that: Anyone who has custody of a detainee shall be obliged to bring him before the competent authority as soon as that authority requires this. […] The Habeas Corpus Act shall determine the summary proceeding to comply with the requirements of paragraphs a), b), c), d), e), f) and g) and shall establish the respective penalties. 378. In addition, article 1 of Law No. 5353 on Habeas Corpus of 1914 (supra para. 182), in force at the time of the facts, established that: Anyone who has been deprived of his liberty for any reason in the Dominican Republic has the right, either at his own request or that of any other person, […] to a writ of habeas corpus in order to determine the reasons for his imprisonment or deprivation of liberty and so that, in the appropriate cases, his liberty is restored. 379. Regarding the arguments on the alleged violation of Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention, the State referred to Law No. 5353 on Habeas Corpus arguing that the law established the “effective domestic remedy” of habeas corpus, that would have allowed any of the presumed victims to question the lawfulness of their detention (supra para. 341). However, as indicated previously, the Court reiterates that remedies must not only exist formally by law, but they must also be effective. In this regard, the Court has ruled on Article 7(6) of the Convention indicating that it “signifies that the detainee effectively exercises this right, presuming that he is able to do so, and that the State effectively provides this remedy and decides it.” 437 Nevertheless, bearing in mind the circumstances in which the deprivations of liberty occurred, especially owing to the expedited expulsion, the said presumed victims who were detained had no opportunity whatsoever to file an effective remedy that would examine the lawfulness of their detention. Therefore, the Court finds that the State violated Article 7(6) of the Convention, to the detriment of the members of the Jean, Medina and Fils-Aimé families and Rafaelito Pérez Charles and Bersson Gelin. B.2.1.5. Conclusion 380. As indicated in the preceding paragraphs, the State violated the right to personal liberty, established in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article 7 of the American Convention, in relation to non-compliance with the obligation to respect rights established in Article 1(1) of this instrument, to the detriment of Willian Medina Ferreras, Lilia Jean Pierre, Luis Ney Medina, Awilda Medina, Carolina Isabel Medina (deceased), Jeanty FilsAimé (deceased), Janise Midi, Antonio Fils-Aimé, Diane Fils-Aimé, Endry Fils-Aimé, Rafaelito Pérez Charles, Bersson Gelin, Victor Jean, Marlene Mesidor, Markenson Jean, Victoria Jean (deceased), Miguel Jean and Natalie Jean, and also in relation to the rights of 435 140. 436 Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, para. 126, and Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, para. Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama, para. 129, and Case of J. v. Peru, para. 170. 437 Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haiti. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of May 6, 2008. Series C No. 180, para. 114, and Case of Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, para. 143. 122