33. Also, neither in this brief nor subsequently, did the State affirm that expulsion proceedings had been instituted, in relation to the facts concerning the presumed victims. This is consistent with the State’s denial that these acts of expulsion or deportation really occurred. Contrary to the Dominican Republic, the representatives and the Commission alleged that the expulsions or deportations did happen, and that they were carried out without a proper expulsion procedure that would have allowed the presumed victims who, according to the alleged facts were summarily deported to Haiti, to file an effective remedy. This Court considers that it is not possible to examine the alleged preliminary objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies in relation to the remedy of amparo, because the dispute described cannot be decided in a preliminary way, but are related to the merits of the matter. 33 34. Based on the above, the Court rejects the preliminary objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies filed by the State. B) Objection of the Court’s lack of competence ratione temporis B.1. Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 35. The State, in its answering brief, argued that it “accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Court on March 25, 1999,” and that: This act […] took place at least one (1) year after the presumed expulsion of Benito Tide Méndez, four (4) years after the alleged first deportation of Bers[s]on Gelin, almost five (5) years after the supposed expulsion of […] Ana Virginia Nolasco, Ana Lidia Sensión, Reyita Antonia Sensión and Antonio Sensión and at least one (1) year after the presumed first deportation of Victor Jean, Marlene Mesidor, M[ar]Kenson Jean, Miguel Jean and Natalie Jean (bold type in the original text). 36. The State also pointed out that, in their motions and arguments brief, the representatives had explicitly indicated that they were not submitting the facts relating to the expulsion of Benito Tide to the Court because these occurred in 1998. The State also indicated that “[i]t is not true” that, as affirmed by the representatives, the presumed victims, members of the Sensión family, have remained separated from their loved ones for eight years. It added that “Antonio Sensión, Ana Lidia Sensión and Reyita Antonia Sensión possess their Dominican identity and voter registration cards,” and that Ana Virginia Nolasco (hereinafter also “Mrs. Nolasco” or “Ana Virginia”) “has been able to reside and move around [Dominican Republic] owing to the legal effects of the safeconducts granted by the [State] in 2002, renewed in 2012 and in force [until February 10, 2013].” 37. The State asserted that “not only is the exceptional derogation of the principle of the non-retroactivity of treaties inapplicable to this case but, furthermore, the factual framework of the application only alleges the occurrence of acts of an instantaneous nature that began to be executed and that concluded before March 25, 1999.” 38. The Commission argued that the “human rights violations established in this case remain unpunished.” It added that “acts and omissions of the State that occurred after [the acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction] establish the continuing violation of the right to nationality and the arbitrary interference in family life.” It linked the impossibility of some presumed victims to return to the Dominican Republic to structural conditions of discrimination that make them afraid to go back, and indicated that this situation 33 The Court has decided similarly in previous cases: cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary objections. Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 94, and Case of Liakat Ali Alibux v. Suriname, para. 21. 16