d) The alleged facts relating to the expulsion of Victor Jean in 1998. 45. To the contrary, the Court is competent to rule on facts that, as indicated in the Merits report, occurred after March 25, 1999. 46. Hence, the Court will examine the facts that took place following the acceptance of its contentious jurisdiction by the Dominican Republic that are independent facts that may constitute autonomous violations. 39 47. Consequently, the Court admits partially the preliminary objection of lack of temporal competence, in the terms described above. 48. However, according to Article 42(1) of the Rules of Procedure, “[p]reliminary objections may only be filed in the [answering] brief.” Therefore, the State’s presentation in its final written arguments of an objection of lack of competence ratione temporis in relation to the Medina and Fils-Aimé families is time-barred. 40 Nevertheless, it will be taken into account, as pertinent, when examining the merits of the case. 41 C. Objection of the Court’s lack of competence ratione personae C.1. Arguments of the parties and the Commission 49. The State noted that Victor Jean, and the members of his family, “Marlene Mesidor, Ma[r]kenson Jean, Victoria Jean, Miguel Jean, Nat[…]alie Jean, Jessica Jean and Victor Manuel Jean,” were not “identified by the Inter-American Commission in the Admissibility report. 42 It asked that the Court “declare the application inadmissible ratione personae” with regard to them. It asserted that the presentation of the members of the Jean family as presumed victims “violates the State’s right of defense and the principle of procedural equality, because the State did not have the corresponding procedural opportunity to defend itself in the case [of] the Jean family.” It added that the State should have the was destroyed by the Dominican officials” and, on this basis, “conclude[d] that the State violated the[ir] rights to juridical personality and to nationality.” When submitting the case to the Court, the Commission asked that the Court declare the violation of these rights to the detriment of the said persons. However, at the same time, the Commission indicated that it submitted the case to the Court only with regard to “the [alleged] acts and human rights violations committed by the State […] that have continued since the acceptance of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction on March 25, 1999.” Therefore, since the said destruction of documents or the impossibility of presenting them occurred before March 25, 1999, these facts fall outside the Court’s temporal competence and were not submitted to its consideration. 39 Cf. Case of the Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador. Preliminary objections. Judgment of November 23, 2004. Series C No. 118, para. 84, and Case of García Lucero et al. v. Chile, para. 35. 40 The State explained that, since the most recent temporal reference was only made during the public hearing, it had not presented the objection in its answering brief and, therefore, presented the objection in its final written arguments, an occasion that, according to the State, is the “opportune procedural moment […] according to Article 57(2) of the Court’s Rules of Procedure.” 41 The Court also notes that the State did not affirm that the respective facts, as described in the Merits report, were outside the Court’s temporal competence. The Court will consider the facts that fall within the factual framework of the case, within the limits of its temporal competence, and based on the relevant evidence. 42 The State alleged, referring to the Merits report, that, in order to consider the said persons as victims, the Commission had taken into account the State’s position during the friendly settlement process and the provisional measures (paragraph 109 of the Merits report asserts that during the friendly settlement process both parties regarded the Jean family as victims in this case,” and that “the State granted them safe-conducts in the context of the implementation of the provisional measures.” The State rejected this, indicating that: (a) although the friendly settlement procedure and the proceedings of a contentious case may intersect, their juridical and their procedural nature are distinct, as indicated by the Convention.” Regarding the former, it asserted that, in paragraph 124 of its judgment in the case of Abrill Alosilla, the Court had stated: “not every position taken […] before the Commission gives rise to […] an acknowledgement of facts or of responsibility.” 19