although the State acknowledged that these persons were born in Dominican territory, they did not have documentation that proved their Dominican nationality. To the contrary, the State affirmed that they have the right to Haitian nationality so that, it understood that they would not become stateless if they were not granted Dominican nationality (supra para. 247). With regard to Victor Jean, the facts of the case (supra para. 222) reveal that he was born in the Dominican Republic, 328 despite which he did not have documentation to prove his nationality of that country. The Court notes that, even though some of the said individuals were born before the acceptance of the Court’s temporal competence, the lack of documentation continued following the acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction and therefore the Court is competent to examine that circumstance. 278. Regarding the above-mentioned individuals, the fact that must be examined is an omission, as of March 25, 1999, consisting in the said lack of documentation to prove their identity and nationality. In response, the State has argued that this does not constitute a violation of the American Convention because, for legal reasons, these individuals are not entitled to that documentation. Thus, the Court must now examine the State’s arguments in order to determine whether the State is responsible for this omission. 279. The Court notes that the State has argued that, based on its domestic laws, the presumed victims were not entitled to Dominican nationality by the application of ius soli, and that the State has no obligation to grant it to them because, in its opinion, they would not be made stateless (supra paras. 247, 248 and 277, and infra para. 293). In view of the State’s assertion that, in this case, the presumed victims, for legal reasons, were not Dominican, the Court finds that it is not necessary to verify factual aspects relating to the alleged obstacles to obtain documents, or the alleged “refusal” of the authorities to grant these. 280. Regarding the alleged legal aspects, the Court finds it relevant to begin by recalling that the regulation of nationality in the Constitutions in force at the time of the birth of the said presumed victims, which were the 1955 and the 1994 Constitutions, was governed by the principle of ius soli, 329 with two exceptions. Thus, articles 12(2) and 11(1), 328 According to the criteria for the assessment of the evidence (supra paras. 193 to 198), based on the evidence available, the Court understands that Victor Jean was born in Dominican territory in 1958. 329 In this regard, it should be pointed out that the Court has observed that the laws of most States Parties to the American Convention are based on a system that combines the principle of the acquisition of nationality by ius soli with elements of ius sanguinis. It is interesting to note that Chile has a regulation similar to that of the 1955, 1966 and 1994 Dominican Constitutions; article 10 of the 1980 Constitution of the Republic of Chile stipulates: “The following are Chileans: 1. Those born in the territory of Chile, with the exception of the children of aliens who are in Chile in the service of their own Government, and of the children of transient aliens, all of whom may, however, opt for Chilean nationality.” In this regard, it should be emphasized that the Supreme Court of Chile has affirmed that the concept of “children of transient aliens” should be understood in its “natural and obvious” sense, referring to the Diccionario de la Real Academia, which defines a “transient” as “a person who travels or passes through a place, who is passing through, who is only residing temporarily in a place.” According to the Supreme Court of Chile, “in Chile it is possible to distinguish between persons domiciled and transients, because domicile is residence accompanied by the real or presumptive intention of remaining there.” On this basis, the Supreme Court of Chile has considered that foreign citizens in an irregular migratory situation who have remained in the country with the intention of remaining there cannot be classified as mere “transient aliens,” so that the exception to the acquisition of Chilean nationality based on the principle of ius soli established in article 10(1) of the Constitution could not be applied to their children born in Chilean territory. See, for example: judgment of December 28, 2009, of the Supreme Court of Chile, Case file 6073/2009. This case law has been reiterated: judgment of January 22, 2013, of the Supreme Court of Chile, Case file 7580/2012. In addition, it should be noted that article 96.1(a) of the 1991 Colombian Constitution indicates that: “[t]he following are Colombian nationals […b]y birth: the people of Colombia who meet one of two conditions: that the father or mother is a Colombian national or indigenous person, or that, in the case of children of aliens, one of their parents was domiciled in the Republic at the time of the birth.” The Colombian courts have interpreted “domicile” as legal residence or domicile. The Council of State has indicated that “domicile, as a legal concept, supposes the legal entry into country.” The Constitutional Court of Colombia has understood that aliens for whom “it has not been found that a visa has been issued” by Colombia, and who “do not appear in any records as aliens 91