PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS 24. The State filed three preliminary objections concerning: (a) the alleged failure to exhaust domestic remedies; (b) the Court’s alleged lack of competence ratione temporis in relation to certain facts and acts, and (c) the aforementioned partial lack of competence ratione personae “in relation to the members of the Jean family.” A) Preliminary objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies A.1. Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 25. The State argued: (a) that the process before the Commission failed to comply with the appropriate procedure in relation to the State’s argument of failure to exhaust domestic remedies, and (b) the existence of effective domestic remedies that had not been exhausted, and mentioned the existence of the remedy of amparo. 22 26. In this regard, the State asserted that the Commission had “received the petition on November 12, 1999,” and that, in a brief of “August 8, 2000,” 23 presented in the context of the processing of the provisional measures, 24 the State had advised the Commission that “the remedies of the domestic jurisdiction ha[d] not been exhausted […] and presented a certification in this regard.” Furthermore, in its answering brief, the State clarified that amparo “was the effective domestic remedy.” 25 In addition, it indicated in this brief that “the Supreme Court of Justice […] recognized and regulated the action for amparo, based on the impact of Article 25 of the American Convention on the domestic jurisdiction,” 26 and that “the National Congress [had] enacted Law No. 437-06, of November 30, 2006, establishing the remedy of amparo.” The State added that, in its Admissibility report and also in its Merits report, the Commission had affirmed that “the State had not filed the objection of [failure to] exhaust domestic remedies.” It also 22 It should be mentioned that, in its final written arguments, the State affirmed that it “reiterate[d] that the domestic remedies available at the time of the presumed facts and/or acts described in the factual framework of the case were: (I) the application for habeas corpus to counter any infringement of the right to personal liberty; (II) the application for amparo to safeguard any fundamental right other than personal liberty, and (III) the remedies of the contentious-administrative jurisdiction to counter the alleged acts and decisions of the agents of the General Directorate of Immigration. However, and consistent […] with [its] procedural position, the State only present[ed] arguments in relation to the availability and effectiveness of the application for amparo in the instant case, and the failure to exhaust this substantiates this objection” (bold type in the original text). Based on the State’s observations, the Court will only analyze the arguments relating to the “application for amparo,” in relation to the said preliminary objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies. 23 Secretariat of State for Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic. The State’s brief of December 15, 1999, answering the request for precautionary measures sent by the Commission. The State’s brief of August 8, 2000, answering the transfer of case, Note No. DEI.-99-1367 of December 7, 1999 (file of annexes to the Merits report, annex 1, fs. 6 to 25). 24 This document was in the case file processed before the Commission, which the latter forward to the Court. The State explained that, “during the first public hearing held by the Court […] to examine [the provisional measures related to the case, it had] deposited a brief dated August 8, 2000, in which it clarified” – referring to the requirement of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies – that the Supreme Court of Justice had “recognize[d], in a judgment delivered on February 24, 1999, the remedy of amparo based on the American Convention.” It indicated that, on that occasion, the Commission had advised the Court “that it should not refer to the said brief, […] because it would be dealt with within the contentious procedure instituted before [the Commission.” 25 It also indicated that “[t]he procedure on provisional measures and that on a contentious case […] are of a different juridical and procedural nature.” 26 The State, in its answering brief, advised that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice had been delivered on February 24, 1999. It also argued that, more recently, “within the framework of the 2010 amendment of the Constitution, the Legislature had enacted the Organic Law of the Constitutional Court and Constitutional Proceedings No. 137-11 on June 13, 2011 [… in which] it authorized new types of amparo remedies, such as the amparo on compliance, collective amparo, and electoral amparo.” 13