22 develop as long as States are inclined to place themselves above the law" 79. 78. Is this the sad example that Trinidad and Tobago would really wish to follow? I could hardly believe it. How would that appear to the future generations of its own jurists? Expectations from the new generations of jurists are always high, - hoping that they will succeed to right the wrongs made by their predecessors, - while, on the other hand, politicians (also referred to rather elegantly as "decision-makers") look the same everywhere in the world, and there seem to be no compelling reasons to expect much from them. 79. Not only do they look the same everywhere, but they have further looked the same at all times. Already over three centuries before our era, in his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle could hardly hide or dissimulate his concern as to what politicians might be thinking or what decisions were they about to take 80. In the XIIIth. century, in his Treatise on the Law, Thomas Aquinas wondered whether the recta ratio could ever be apprehended by the power-holders 81. It would be hard to deny that, with extremely rare exceptions, politicians, always and everywhere, have appeared much more engaged in gaining and retaining power (for power's sake), than in securing the observance of the human rights of those they govern or are supposed to represent. 80. The States which, in the history of international adjudication, have "withdrawn" from contentious proceedings instituted against them (particularly after an initial decision of the Tribunal adverse to them), have adopted a "self-judging conduct", harmful to the international rule of law, and, ultimately, also to themselves, to their own reputation, as "A State which would be a judge in its own cause is an advocate pleading into a void from which no clear answer is returned" 82. 81. Non-appearance is in fact foreseen in Article 53 of the Statute of the ICJ, its raison d'être being to secure that the Court carries out its functions whenever one of the parties fails to appear before it; the non-appearing State remains a party to the case, and remains fully bound by the decision rendered by the Court 83 (as if it had appeared before the Court). This is what ensues also from Article 27 (on default procedure) of the current Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court, which likewise foresee non-appearance in the same understanding, and entitle the InterAmerican Court, whenever a party fails to appear in or continue with a case, to take such measures, on its own motion, as may be necessary to complete the consideration of the case. Article 27 adds that when a party enters a case at a later stage of the proceedings, it shall take up the proceedings at that stage. 79 . G.L. Scott and C.L. Carr, "The ICJ and Compulsory Jurisdiction: the Case for Closing the Clause", 81 American Journal of International Law (1987) p. 66. For my own criticisms of that defiance, cf. A.A. Cançado Trindade, "Nicarágua versus Estados Unidos (1984-1985): Os Limites da Jurisdição `Obrigatória' da Corte Internacional de Justiça e as Perspectivas da Solução Judicial de Controvérsias Internacionais", 37-38 Boletim da Sociedade Brasileira de Direito Internacional (1983-1986) pp. 71-96. 80 . Cf. Aristóteles, Ética Nicomaquea - Política, Mexico, Edit. Porrúa, 2000; book I, section XIII, p. 15; book VIII, section XI, p. 112; book X, section IX, pp. 144-146. 81 . Cf. Tomás de Aquino, Tratado de la Ley - Tratado de la Justicia - Gobierno de los Príncipes, Mexico, Edit. Porrúa, 2000, pp. 35, 50 and 76-77. 82 . J.B. Elkind, Non-Appearance before the International Court of Justice - Functional and Comparative Analysis, Dordrecht, Nijhoff/Kluwer, 1984, pp. 169 and 206. 83 . S.A. Alexandrov, "Non-Appearance before the International Court of Justice", 33 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (1995) n. 41, pp. 41-44, 60, 63 and 68.