SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE A.A. CANÇADO TRINDADE 1. I have concurred with my vote in the adoption of the present Judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Caesar versus Trinidad and Tobago case. Given the relevant legal issues dealt with by the Court in its decision, as well as those underlying it and those surrounding the present case, I feel obliged to leave on the records my personal reflections on them as foundations of my position on the matter. I shall address, in the present Separate Opinion, the following points which I consider of key importance, not only for a better understanding of the Court's decision in the present Caesar case, but also for the handling of future cases in which such issues may possibly also be raised: a) the humanization of the law of the treaties, as illustrated by developments concerning interpretation of treaties, reservations to treaties, denunciation of treaties, and termination and suspension of the operation of treaties; b) international rule of law: non-appearance before an international tribunal and the duty of compliance with its judgment; and c) the expanding material content and scope of jus cogens in contemporary international law. I. The Humanization of the Law of Treaties. 2. It is hardly surprising that basic considerations of humanity surround recently emerged domains of international law, such as that of the international protection of human rights. But the incidence of those considerations upon more traditional areas of international law, which were in the past approached, almost invariably, from the angle of the "will" of States, is indicative of the new times, and a new mentality centred rather on the ultimate addressees of international norms, the human beings. 3. The law of treaties affords a pertinent illustration, disclosing that it is no longer entirely at the mercy of the "will" of States and that it, too, acknowledges certain superior common values that the international community as a whole deems should be preserved. Pertinent examples can be found in such areas of the law of treaties pertaining to interpretation of treaties, reservations to treaties, denunciation of treations, and termination and suspension of the operation of treaties. I shall review, however succinctly, each of them, before presenting my concluding observations on the matter. 1. Considerations on the Interpretation of Treaties. a) General Remarks. 4. When one comes to the interpretation of human rights treaties, as well as of other international treaties, one is inclined to resort at first to the provisions enshrined in Articles 31-33 of the two Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties (of 1969 and 1986, respectively), and in particular to the combination under Article 31 of the elements of the ordinary meaning of the terms, the context, and the object and purpose of the treaties at issue1. One then promptly finds that, in practice, while in traditional law there has been a marked tendency to pursue a rather restrictive interpretation which gives as much precision as possible to the obligations of States Parties, in the international law of human rights, somewhat distinctly, there has been 1 . Cf. Maarten Bos, "Theory and Practice of Treaty Interpretation", 27 Netherlands International Law Review (1980) pp. 3-38 and 135-170; W. Lang, "Les règles d'interprétation codifiées par la Convention de Vienne sur le Droit des Traités et les divers types de traités", 24 Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (1973) pp. 113-173; C.H. Schreuer, "The Interpretation of Treaties by International Courts", 45 British Year Book of International Law (1971) pp. 255-301; Ch. de Visscher, Problèmes d'interprétation judiciaire en Droit international public, Paris, Pédone, 1963, pp. 9-264.