effective for resolving the alleged victims’ legal situation, for which reason there was no violation of the American Convention. In addition, the State notes that the IACHR is not a court of appeal for the review of domestic proceedings. 27. The State adds that following the rejection of the remedy for annulment and the appeal presented by the petitioner in connection with the release amparo, they filed requests for expansion and clarification, both of which were dismissed. The expansion remedy was denied on the grounds that, according to the court, the rejection of the remedy for annulment was not unclear. Similarly, the clarification remedy was denied because it was deemed inadmissible. 28. The State contends that the alleged victims were judged by the appropriate venue and, if they had any disagreement with former President Pinto, the Law of the Judicial Function of the National Police was available to them for challenging his position as president. Ecuador states that there is no evidence of the petitioner having filed an administrative action with the competent authority in connection with that matter. Similarly, regarding the failure of the Minister of the Interior and Police to intervene, it notes that the minister had no jurisdiction to participate directly in the alleged victims’ criminal trial and, had he done so, he would have assumed functions that did not correspond to his office, thereby incurring in a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. In addition, Ecuador maintains that the judges acted with full independence and impartiality in the legal proceedings and at all times due process was upheld. 29. At the same time, as regards the compensation suit, it claims that the petitioner did not bring that matter before the civil courts, which would have been the appropriate venue. It also claims that after conducting a search in the judicial archive of cases lodged with the Supreme Court of Justice, it was unable to locate a case dealing with the alleged victims. As a result, on this point the domestic remedies were not exhausted. The State indicates three ways in which the alleged victims could have brought a suit for damages: a) Against former President Pinto before the police courts, pursuant to Articles 20, 21, and 22 of the Constitution. In such proceedings, according to the State, the petitioner could have invoked Articles 2232, 2233, and 2234 of the Codification of the Civil Code, dealing with the civil courts, in his case against former President Pinto in pursuit of redress for pain and suffering, regarding which the police courts were not competent. b) Proceedings against former President Pinto before what is now the former Supreme Court of Justice, under Article 979 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Upon receiving the suit, the Supreme Court would have asked the CNJP’s judges for a report. If the harm was established, the judgment would provide for financial reparations. c) Against former President Pinto before the civil courts, on the basis of Article 22 of the Constitution. 30. In addition, the State contends the petitioner incurs in inconsistency and “bad faith” by arguing that the case was judged by a flawed inquisitorial system, considering that in August 2007 Mr. Villarroel assumed the presidency of the CNJP. Finally, the State asks the Commission to rule the petition inadmissible for not meeting the requirements set in Articles 46 and 47 of the Convention and for not establishing deficient actions on the part of the agencies of justice. 5