knowledge of the person making the statement. […] Thus, a mere discrepancy with other experts over the conclusions that were reached does not establish the offense that is now being charged. Not even an error or ignorance can charge a person with this offense. […] Therefore, it is not the duty of the judge, as the parties claim, to act as a third-party expert, but rather to examine whether or not the expertise, in the concrete case, is in line with the facts that have been investigated and are at least accurate. […] The other accusation made by the complaint, which does not appear in the prosecution’s indictment, is the concealment of alleged falsehoods in the medical record. Now, regarding this item, so that this accusation can be leveled at the medical examiners, it must have been proven that indeed it was falsified substantially and that this was not voluntarily reported to the judge by the official experts […]. It is impossible to accuse the medical examiners of having covered up a falsehood which, to date, has not been proven […]. Furthermore, and as the investigating judge did indeed highlight, the alleged falsehoods and omissions were only uncovered later, after the physicians had worked on the materials sent to them by the court. Under these conditions, there is no other alternative but to uphold the acquittal that is under appeal.”50 44. The complainant filed a cassation appeal, which was dismissed on October 20, 1999 by the National Criminal Cassation Court, because it believed that the appeal “will not succeed, because in addition to not providing the reason for the nullification for lack of grounds indicated by the complainants to proceed to opening an extraordinary instance, in the understanding that the procedure being challenged provides sufficient reasons and adequate grounds to the decision that was adopted there. As a result, it must be pointed out that, because there are no grounds for assuming that the above-mentioned judgment was arbitrary, the cassation appeal is hereby ruled inadmissible.”51 45. On November 2, 1999, the complainant filed an appeal regarding the denied cassation with the National Criminal Cassation Court, stating that “the institutional gravity highlighted by this case is such that the First Chamber of the Court cannot argue that the cassation is denied on the basis of one blanket argument that there is no nullification for lack of grounds, that the ruling provides sufficient reasons, or that a cassation does not pertain because the assumption of arbitrariness is not proven. NOTHING ELSE. It considers that this complaint has thus been deprived of the constitutional right to a substantiated judgment.”52 The appeal was dismissed on March 30, 2000 for the following reasons: First of all, it is relevant here to point out that, as indicated by the Court a quo, in the resolution that upholds the acquittal of the defendants, in these proceedings “the cause of death of Cristina Britez Arce is not investigated, but rather whether or not there was an offense perpetrated by the physicians who conducted the expertise at the request of the judge hearing case, with respect to the other expertise by Dr. Casavilla and Dr. Poggi […]. This accusation comes from the expertise provided by Dr. Cacciavillani and Dr. Llabot “physicians from Córdoba belonging to the Catholic University of Córdoba, proposed by the complaint to perform the role of official experts and main evidence…” in these proceedings, which basically affirm the existence of a pathology―eclampsia or preeclampsia―in the patient who “was neither treated nor diagnosed by the physicians of Sardá.” […] It must be pointed out here that the respondent has nothing to say about the reasoning set forth―as the basis for its grievances is the absence of motivation for the judgment of alleged violations of the principle of sufficient grounds, the rules of logic, psychology, and common experience and for lack of conclusive proof and its alteration―, because of which, in that regard, its submittal fails to provide autonomous substantiation because it does not refute the arguments on the basis of which the Court upholds the acquittal ruled by the Investigating Judge. Although this omission of the cassation appeal would be enough to rule its inadmissibility, further still it must be stated here that, despite the sharp discrepancies between the expert reports prepared by the experts designated by the National University of Córdoba and by the members of the Medical Examiners Corps, the questions brought to this court deal with situations referring to reviews of matters of fact and evidence that do not pertain to the present appeal that was filed, which did not highlight any flaws in the judgments made by the Court a quo that would make it possible to qualify its judgment as arbitrary or groundless. […] Finally, it is necessary to point out, regarding the alleged irregularities in the medical record, that the decision of this court is made strictly in the context of the appeal of the complaint […] it cannot involve itself in reviewing situations that are being examined in a different case […].”53 Appeal court judgment of August 6, 1999. Annex to the initial petition. Cassation judgment of October 20, 1999. Annex to the initial petition. 52 Complaint appeal filed by the complainants on November 2, 1999. Annex to the initial petition. 53 Ruling on the complaint appeal, March 30, 2000. Annex to the initial petition. 50 51 10