fetus has no relationship with the cause of death of the mother” (see pages 1028 verso). It was observed that, although for Dr. Adaro, “the woman was poorly managed, which is what led to the death of the fetus,” when making this statement he recognizes that “this does not imply that it was relevant for the cause of death of the mother” (see page 1028 verso). […] To the complexity of the case itself must be added the two criminal cases preceding the issuance of this judgment. […] Six (6) expert reports were prepared. I repeat: six reports. The first prepared by Dr. Carlos Poggi and Florencia Casavilla of the Medical Examiners Corps; the second signed by Dr. Héctor Papagni and Dr. Horacio Schiavo, also from the Medical Examiners Corps of National Justice; one plenary with all the physicians of said institution―except for those already named―from which three other reports emerged: one signed by 31 physicians, another signed by 5, and the last signed by 4. Finally, the expert report entrusted to Dr. Jorge A. Caccavillani and Dr. Rene Llabot, professors at the University of Córdoba. On the basis of this last report, the complaint argued the establishment of the crime of false expertise and cover-up of the medical examiners who participated in the report signed by 31 of them. […] In my opinion what was required, rather than going back to all the proceedings of the cases processed in the criminal justice system (although logically there would be references and reviews of evidence to be found there), was to move forward with a rigorous review of the treatment provided to the victim during her pregnancy for the purposes of finding, to the extent possible, a response for her death. […] In line with this kind of idea, a new expert was designated, one specializing in obstetrics (Dr. Barrón). […] d) The criminal cases, what has been examined up to now does not enable me to conclude, with a degree of certainty relevant to a ruling of this kind, that there was culpability […]. The case is not clear (we do not know why the victim died) but we do know there is a lack of elements to build a causal chain, which is what is required to move forward with the claim for compensation filed by the complainant. This is only my assessment. The criminal judge, when issuing the judgment of acquittal of the physicians here, among other considerations, pointed out the following: “the pregnancy occurred within normal parameters, that is without signs of high blood pressure, with reactive fetal monitoring, without any evidence of proteinuria, with normal readings of creatinine levels, without checking the sudden and excessive gain in weight that was alleged, all of this in a patient who had not had a kidney removed surgically, reasons for which the treating physicians were under no obligation to admit the pregnant woman to the hospital at any time prior to childbirth” (see page 2089 of the criminal case). For the judge nor was it “possible to accuse Dr. Anido and Dr. Negro for having transformed the source of licit danger into an illicit one, because on the basis of the documentation that was gathered and in the absence of an autopsy that would have made it possible to establish the causes of death, there was no evidence substantiating the existence of the source of danger, as this situation was understood to be pathological and different from that of the pregnancy” (see pages 289 verso of the criminal case). […] it is evident that the criminal judge has not been able to establish the connection between the harmful event (the death of Ms. Arce) and the actions taken by the physicians charged. […] Because of that, only by assuming that the guilt of the physicians charged has been proven (which is not what has occurred in this case) can its relevance in the harmful event which is our concern be examined.60 51. On June 21, 2011, the complainant requested revoking the return of the brief denouncing Dr. Barrón “who had an express and concrete opinion which was compromised with respect to the issue which is the subject under dispute and whose ruling is pending on which your expertise must focus, because it does not provide sufficient guarantees of certainty of impartiality as required […].”61 On July 5 of the same year, the Court of Appeals dismissed the revocation appeal.62 52. On February 7, 2012, the Civil Appeal Courts issued a judgment of second instance upholding the dismissal of the complaint.63 On May 8, 2012, the extraordinary appeal was denied, pointing out that “the matter ruled upon is based on fact and evidence and common law and procedural law, pertaining to the judges of the case and alien to the extraordinary appeal, and the judgment […] benefits from substantive grounds of a nature that would support it as a jurisdictional act, which circumvents the objection of arbitrariness […]. Constitutional Judgment from the court of first instance, November 25, 2009. Annex to the brief of January 10, 2016 from the petitioners. Revocation request of June 21, 2011. Annex to the brief of January 10, 2016 from the petitioners. 62 Ruling of July 5, 2011. Annex to the brief of January 10, 2016 from the petitioners. 63 Judgment of February 7, 2012. Annex to the brief of January 10, 2016 from the petitioners. 60 61 12