9 were submitted directly by Mr. Cantos in his “own name and in the name of his companies.” Consequently, this Court could examine the alleged violation of the rights of Mr. Cantos under the Convention at the corresponding merits stage, in the terms of paragraphs 40 and 41. 31. Argentina does not explain the logic used to derive the conclusion it reached from the text of Article 1(2) of the Convention (supra §§ 22 and 23). However, international jurisprudence has reiterated that those who seek to use logic must demonstrate the steps used in this operation12. Having demonstrated that the interpretation of Article 1(2) of the American Convention is based on an invalid reasoning, the Court considers that it must reject the objection filed on lack of competence. VII SECOND PRELIMINARY OBJECTION 32. The other preliminary objection filed by Argentine is based on the terms on which it accepted the jurisdiction of this Court. As mentioned above (supra, § 21), the State became a party to the Convention on September 5, 1984, and deposited the respective ratification instrument with the Secretariat of the Organization of American States. On the same date, it accepted the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court, but put on record that the obligations it had assumed “would only take effect with regard to acts that occurred after the ratification of the said instrument.” In view of this statement, Argentina maintains that the Court is only competent to hear cases on acts that occurred after September 5, 1984. The State considers that the facts of the instant case occurred before that date and, therefore, the Court is not competent to hear them. 33. Before examining this objection on lack of competence, the Court deems it appropriate to indicate some rules of international law that have not been set forth clearly in this dispute. 34. In this respect, it is evident from the text of the Convention that a State may be a party to it and accept or reject the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court. Article 62 of the Convention uses the verb “may” to signify that acceptance of the jurisdiction is optional. It should also be emphasized that the Convention establishes obligations for States. These obligations are the same for all the States parties, in other words, they bind in the same way and with the same strength both the State party that has accepted the obligatory jurisdiction of the Court and the State party that has not done so. Also, it is necessary to distinguish between “reservations to the Convention” and “acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court”. The latter is a unilateral act of each State, governed by the terms of the American Convention as a whole13 and, therefore, not subject to reservations. Although some doctrine refers to “reservations” to the acceptance of the jurisdiction of an international court, in 12 Cf. Arbitral award of VII.31.1989, on the delimitation of the maritime frontier between GuineaBissau and Senegal, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. XX, pp. 135-136; and arbitral award of X.10.1995, on la Laguna del Desierto, §§ 77 and 78. 13 Cf. Constantine et al. case, Preliminary Objections, supra note 6, para. 74; Benjamin et al. case, Preliminary Objections, supra note 6, para. 75; Hilaire case, Preliminary Objections, supra note 6, para. 83; Case of the Constitutional Court. Competence, supra note 6, paras. 35 and 36; and Ivcher Bronstein case. Competence, supra note 6, paras. 36 and 37.