now being discussed took place.” The State also indicated that Mr. Oyarte “was an employee at the Constitutional Court at the time when the alleged victims were Judges and was even the direct subordinate of one of them, Enrique Herrería Bonnet, [so that] it [would] not be possible [for him to] maintain any of the characteristics of objectivity and impartiality essential to appear before the […] Court as an expert witness.” Thus, the State concluded that “the existence of close ties has been demonstrated and also the subordinate nature of his role while he worked at the service of one of the alleged victims in the former Constitutional Court.” 19. Mr. Oyarte responded to the State’s challenge by pointing out that “the information contained in the objection is inaccurate.” He stated that he was an adviser at the Constitutional Court from the date indicated in the objection, until he submitted his resignation on April 15, 2005, “as confirmed in the certificate issued by the Department of Human Resources of the Constitutional Court, which is attached to the objection.” Finally, the expert witness indicated that he “did not join the Constitutional Court at the request of Mr. Enrique Herrería Bonnet and after his termination, [he] returned to offer his services in the same Court until [he] resigned.” 20. As to Mr. Ponce, the State challenged his expert opinion arguing that there were “differences between the object proposed” in the brief of pleadings and motions and the object stated in the brief “transmitting the definitive list of deponents, a point that may be confirmed by simply reading the documents presented.” The State added that “his incompatibility with the role of expert, would irreparably infringe Article 8” of the American Convention, in other words, “it would compromise the judicial guarantees to which Ecuador is entitled, as a party to the proceedings, given that the aforementioned professional has currently filed cases before this same international court and the inter-American System, in the role of sponsor.” The State concluded that “it is not possible to expect the expert witness proposed to be impartial or objective on a matter in which his opposing party acts in several cases. His intervention would break the procedural balance that should exist in any process, this being a method of debate between parties with equality before a third party that is being judged.” 21. Mr. Ponce responded to the State’s objection by pointing out that “although it is true that he represent[s] persons within the Inter-American Human Rights System, it is no less true that this representation is not among the grounds established in the Rules of the Court for [the] objection to be admissible.” Thus, he concluded that “the object of the expert opinion has no connection with the cases in which he [is] acting as defense counsel.” 22. Regarding the change in the objects of the expert opinions of Messrs. Oyarte and Ponce, the President notes that these have indeed changed from those presented in the brief of pleadings and motions and the definitive list submitted by the representatives. However, the President recalls that modifying the object of an expert opinion is not among the grounds for disqualification mentioned in Article 48 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure, for which reason the objection presented by the State is not valid. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the President understands that the object that will be taken into account in determining the scope of the statement will be that proposed by the representatives in their brief of pleadings and motions. 23. As regards the objection raised against Rafael Oyarte for having been employed at the Constitutional Court at the time when the facts of this case took place, the President notes that in the documents provided by the State, the Constitutional Court 6