11 communities of the area about movements of men in the area, intimidating and threatening the local population with their weapons; 42(12) the inhabitants of Plan de Sánchez were accused by the military of belonging to the guerrilla forces, as they refused to participate in the Civil Defense Patrols or Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil7 (hereinafter the “PAC”). Therefore, in Plan de Sánchez there was a heavy climate of terror that led the men to leave the community to hide from the army; 42(13) despite the terror prevailing in the area, some inhabitants of Plan de Sánchez filed petitions before the Justice of the Peace of Rabinal regarding the constant threats that they received from members of the army, military commissioners, and members of the PAC.8 These petitions were never addressed by the judicial authorities. Instead, those who filed them were fined; 42(14) in early July, 1982, a plane flew over the village of Plan de Sánchez and bombed places near the inhabited areas. On July 15, 1982 an army unit set up a temporary camp at said village, with the aim of inspecting the houses, inquiring into the whereabouts of the men of the community, and threatening its inhabitants; With respect to the Plan de Sánchez Massacre 42(15) Sunday, July 18, 1982 was market day at Rabinal. This was one of the most active days at the municipal capital due to its religious and commercial activities. The inhabitants of neighboring villages came through Plan de Sánchez toward their communities; 7 The representatives of the victims and their next of kin in their brief with pleadings, motions, and evidence pointed out that the PAC “were established in 1981 by then President General Lucas García as a paramilitary force to conduct military operations in the rural areas. Shortly after they were established, Minister of Defense Benedicto Lucas stated with respect to the PAC: ‘Arming civilians for any act, whether personal or communal, is forbidden by the Constitution, but it is legal when said groups are incorporated in the Army.’ […] The responsibility of the Army for the organization and training of the PAC was set forth in Decree 1986, published on January 10, 1986. Participation in the patrols was mandatory and controlled by the Military Commissioners. Refusal was severely punished, sometimes with death. In 1983 the number of patrol members was 700,000 and in 1985 it was one million.” 8 The representatives of the victims and their next of kin in their brief with pleadings, motions, and evidence pointed out that “[...i]n 1985 it was estimated that roughly 10,000 civilians performed military functions as Military Commissioners and 1,000,000 were members of the PAC. Civil collaborators of the Judicial Police, called ‘orejas’, have not been studied in depth: References regarding the number of civil patrol members throughout the country begin in 1981 with approximately 25,000 men. According to official Army figures, ‘in 1982 there were one million civil patrol members.’ Since the reestablishment of civilian government in 1986, their number began to decline: ‘in 1996 there were less than 40,000 organized;’ according to the Army, that year there were 270,906 registered in 15 departments throughout the country. […] These three groups, plus other civilian collaborators, are the lowest echelon of the hierarchical military structure. In the case of the Plan de Sánchez massacre, these civilian elements were under the control of the Military Detachment at Rabinal, which in turn received orders from the Military Base at Cobán. To gather information and carry out military operations, the military and civilians are under the authority of the Intelligence Groups (G2) and the Operational Groups (G3) within the Guatemalan Army. Since 1981, the representatives of these groups within each Base coordinated their strategy with the Intelligence Department and the military commanders in the Government.”