or the European Union, have ruled along the same lines. 154 Even the Peruvian Consumer Protection Commission (CPC) and the Specialized Consumer Protection Chamber of the Tribunal for the Defense of Competition and Intellectual Property have adopted the concept of the “dynamic burden of proof” in cases of discrimination. 155 According to the expert witness Laura Otero, this redistribution of the burden of proof stems from the fact that discrimination is not usually manifested in an open and clearly identifiable manner, since the reason for the difference in treatment is often not expressed or is concealed in another seemingly objective factor. 156 Finally, the Court notes that the amicus brief submitted by the United Nations Working Group on Business and Human Rights, stated the following: In the universal system for the protection of human rights, there is a clear consensus that the burden of proof should not fall exclusively on the victims in cases of discrimination by non-State actors, such as businesses. For this reason, the rule of the dynamic burden of proof in favor of the victims has been recognized as a standard, whereby, depending on the specific case, the burden of proof is reversed, distributed or shifted to the companies against which the discriminatory act or fact is alleged, and a prima facie case of discrimination is presented. 157 111. Based on the foregoing, the Court will now analyze the response provided by the national authorities to the complaint of discriminatory treatment by a company against Mr. Olivera. 112. In the instant case, the Court finds that there are numerous indications that Mr. Olivera and his partner suffered unequal treatment based on their sexual orientation, of which the national authorities were aware. For example, in the response provided by Supermercados Peruanos S.A. to the CPC, the company considered that the behavior of Mr. Olivera and his partner should cease out of “respect for morality and good manners,” since one of its customers had felt “disturbed and uncomfortable” because of Mr. Olivera’s 154 Cf. Council Directive 97/80/EC of December 15, 1997, concerning the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex, OJEC No. 14, of January 20, 1998, Article 4. See also, Council Directive 2000/43/EC, related to the principle of equal treatment of persons irrespective of their racial or ethnic group, OJEC No. 180, of July 19, 2000, para. 21, which states that: “The rules on the burden of proof must be adapted when there is a prima facie case of discrimination and, for the principle of equal treatment to be applied effectively, the burden of proof must shift back to the respondent when evidence of such discrimination is brought.” Also see Council Directive 2004/113/EC, implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, OJEU No. 373, of December 21, 2004, Article 9. 155 Cf. Consumer Protection Commission (CPC), of the National Institute for the Defense of Competition and Protection of Intellectual Property (INDECOPI). Final Decision No. 0911 -2006/CPC, of May 23, 2006, pages 8 and 9 (evidence file, folios 2014 and 2015). By way of illustration, see the Specialized Consumer Protection Chamber of the Tribunal for the Defense of Competition and Protection of Intellectual Property, Decision 3255-2015-SPC-INDECOPI, of October 19, 2015, paras. 32 to 34; Decision No. 3167/2017-SPCINDECOPI, of November 6, 2017, paras. 13 to 20, and Decision No. 2129-2018/SPC-INDECOPI, of August 20, 2018, paras. 16 to 19 (evidence file, folios 2269 to 2270, 2065 and 2238 to 2240, respectively). 156 Cf. Written version of the expert opinion of Laura Otero Norza rendered at the public hearing held on August 24, 2022, in the context of the Court’s 150th Regular Session, page 48 (evidence file, folio 6104). 157 Cf. Amicus curiae brief presented by the UN Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, on September 6. 2022, para. 22 (file of merits, folio 1794). 39